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I JTEODUCTI ON 
1. Purpose , Scope , 1.1ethod 
The purpose of this thesis i s t o g ive an account of illi am 
J ames ' s t heory of religious lmowledge . hat ar e the character-
i st ics of religious experience? fhat cr ~teri on must religi ous 
bel i efs satisfy? How doe s one know t hat God exist s ? What is 
t he source of religious knowledge ? hat are t he proof s of reli-
gious convictions? These and siL ilar questions will be dealt 
with in this t hesis . 
The s cope of t his t hesis is limit ed to J ames ' s epis t en ology 
in so fa1· ss i t is concerned wi t h hi s concept i on of r eli gion . Hi s 
metaphysi cs and axiology will be dea.l t wit h only as far as it is 
necessary to do so in order to pre s en t his t heory of religious 
knowledge . In t he l ast anal ys i s it is i i'l.poss i ble to draw e. line 
between t hese different areas of thought and some arbi tnu~y line 
must t herefore be dra.vm . It is hoped that t he limitations i m-
posed by such a l ine will not result in a bi assed interpretation 
of J runes ' s t heory of rel i gious epist e ology . 
Another difficulty is present in regard to t he scope of 
t hi s t hesis . J ames ' s thought developed t hroughout his life-
t i me and as i t di d so some of his basic belief s ch nged. In 
s o 1e cases t he change took t he form of t he rejection of old 
beliefs for new and entirely different ones . In regard to feel-
ing , for exa ple , when J ames wrote his Varieties he conceived 
of it a s being non-cognit i ve in nature . In a l ater work (Es-
says in Ra.dic o.l Em-o i ric i sm ) feeli ng t lees on a definite cogni-
tive element. In other oases the change resulted merely in 
an enlargement of the original view, not in a basic alteration 
of it. For example, James's pragmatism merely adds to his con-
ception of the will to believe but does not contradict it. 
This thesis will not present the various stages in James's de-
velopment but will be concerned with _his general view of reli-
gious epistemology. 
The method of this thesis is: (1) to depict James's the-
ory of religious experience, (2) to analyze his theory of re-
ligious belief, and (3) to present his pragmatic criterion of 
religious truth. In carrying out this method it has sometimes 
been necessary to paraphrase James's statements or the state-
ments of others about him. The investigation is mainly con-
cerned with James's Psychology,~ Will~ Believe, Varieties, 
and Pragmatism. Moat of his other books will · also be used to 
some extent. Extensive use has also been made of various per-
sona who have written about James. The author is especially in-
debted to John Moore and to J. s. Bixler for their volumes en-
titled, respectively, Theories gi ·Religious Experience and 
Religion 1a ~ Philosophy of William James which have been of 
great value in the preparation of this thesis.l 
2. William James as a ~an 
i. Childhood. William James was born on January 11, 1842 
in New York City, most likely at the Astor House. He was the 
1. As a rule, references to sources are indicated in this the-
sis by abbreviations which are explained in the Bibliography 
at the end of the thesis. The author's name should be con-
sulted. 
2 
son of Henry James and Mary (Walsh) James. The fact that both 
of his grandfathers were of Irish blood partially explains his 
humor, genial temper, and elasticity. James was deeply hnflur 
enced by his father's courageous honesty, his indifference to 
worldly success, and, most of all, to his lifelong devotion to 
the more profound problems of life, especially to religious prob-
lems. "He resembled his father in his exuberance, his condor, 
his tenderness, and in his nervous sensitiveness and instability.nl 
His mother was characterized by selfless devotion, love and un-
worldliness; she seemed to embody the unconscious essence of both 
wife and motherhood. Her love was a less spoiling love and her 
unworldliness less rebellious than that of James's father but 
11 love and unworldliness emanated from them both, and entered in-
to the composition of their children.n2 
James was also deeply influenced by his younger brothers, 
Henry, Wilkinson, and Robertson, and~ his sister Alice. "They 
were all talented, and the spirit of freedom and tolerance which 
pervaded the household encouraged them to act and react vigor-
ously upon one another. 11 3 This was one important factor in 
their general educational development. 
ii. Education. William James's formal education was very 
irregular and intermittent because of the accidnets of residence 
and, what is more important, because of his father's desire for 
1. Malone, DAB, IX, 590. 2. Perry, TCJ, I, 169. 
3. Malone, DAB, IX, 590. Much of the section entitled "William 
James as a Man" has been taken from this source. For con-
densed accounts of James's life and philosophy see~· Amer.; 
XV and Enc. Brit., XII. If a detailed account is desired 
see Perry's ~volume work, TCJ. Much of the material in 
these two volumes were used by him in his shorter work, SWJ~ ' 
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the intellectual development of his children which meant that 
they should 11 develop from within rather than be moulded from 
without.nl William's membership in a large family also greatly 
influenced his education. His constant interaction with his 
talented brothers and sister resulted in increased knowledge 
for all.a Then too, the older members of the family helped to 
educate the junior members. James, being the eldest child, thus 
took an active part in the education of the younger members of 
the family. 
The extensive travelling of the James family contributed 
greatly to their education. In October 1943, when William was 
not yet two years old, they moved to Europe where they remained 
for a year and a half. Then followed a two years' stay in Al-
bany with a subsequent return to New York City. Because of this, 
both William and his brother Henry attended at least three dif-
ferent schools before 1B5rr. In June of that year the James fam-
ily again travelled to Europe, this time with definite education-
al purposes. A series of educational experiments followed, each 
of which was regarded as a failure, but the total effect, as 
judged by the results, was remarkable. 
Many years later Henry spoke of the 11 incorrigible vague-
ness of current in our educational drift.• The vagueness arose 
from the ambiguous attitudes and aptitudes of youth, the drift 
from the mobility of the family, First, the family resided at 
the polyglot Pensionnat Roediger at Chatelaine, Geneva. This 
1. Malone, DAB, IX, 591. 
2. Of. Matthiessen's ~James Family for more information 
on this point. 
4 
was abruptly termine,ted by a return to Engl and in the autumn 
of 1855 . The winter was spent in London wherP. the boys were 
tutored by a Scotch a.n , Robert Tho mpson. The ne xt yea r t hey 
were in Paris with _ . Lerambert of' Rue Je.cob as ned?_gogue , fol-
lowed , after a few months, by the Institution Fezandie con-
ducted by an ex-disciple of Fourier. '\' illi am, whose intere s t 
in p inting was becoming more predominc:mt, also a.ttended the 
e.telier of Leon Cogniet dur ing the: winter. In the summer of 
1857 t he boys entered the College Communal in Boulogne. Then 
followed a summer to America and e. year s 1 residence in Ne·wport, 
Rhode Island. Late in the summer of 1 859 the family again 
went abroad , t his ti 11 e to Switzerland.. William attended the· 
Academy a t Geneva where he was l aJt:er joined by his bro ther Henry. 
The next summer w s snent in Bonn where William continued his 
studies in the house of He r1' Stromberg. 
iii. Vocational Indecision. Willi am J ame s he,d now re-
ceived the rudiments of a liberal educe.tion. Not only did he 
possess the benefits of a formal ·u1d widely varied educ!!ltion 
but he e.lso possessed a large fund of memories which nourished 
his mind and stimulated h is imagina tion. His formal educ a.tion 
consisted l a r gely of languages and ba sic mathematics , but his 
memor ies included the experiences of people , places , literature, 
t he t hee..t er, a)1.n clscapes--all unconsciously a ssimilated, and giv-
ing to his mind a characteristic urbanity and re a.dy adaptabil-
ity.nl 
1. Malone, DAB , IX, 591. 
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With such a wide background Williem had many possi ble vo-
cations which he could enter. These possibilities resolved 
themselves i nto a. choice between science and painting . His 
f ather hoped tha t he woul d choose the less 11 narrowing 11 career 
of the scientist but the artistic interest asserted itself so 
strongly that it could not be disn:ti ssed without a trial . So 
t he f amily returned to Newpor t in Sep tember 1860 where the ex-
periment began in the studio of William Hunt. After a year 
Will iam was convinced tha t he could not att a in distinction in 
the f i eld of art . He def i nit ely ha.d artistic t alent but felt 
t hat unless he could excell in thE! field he shoul d not enter 
it. In writing to a. schoolmate, Charles Ri tt er, J ames said 
that "there is nothing on earth more deplorable tha."l a bad ar-
ti st . 111 J ames refused to be a 11 bccd artist 11 so he turned to the 
career of scientist . In the fall of 1861 he entered La ~rence 
Scientific School, thus inaugurating his connecti ons with Ha.r-
varcl College which continued until his deat h. 
Sci ence was the chosen field but its narrower delimination 
was arrived at only by further doubts a.nd exper i ments. J ames 
spent t hree yea.rs a t the Lowrence Scientific School during 
whi ch time he was devoted mainly to the study of chemistry 
under c. \ . Eliot and to comparative anatomy and physiology 
under Jeffries Wym~n . I n t he autumn of 1864 he entered Har-
vard School . His studies were interrupt ed in April 1865 for 
nine months by the Thayer expedition, conducted by L. Aga.ssiz , 
1. Perry , TCJ, I, 193. 
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which searched for zoological specimens in t he basin of t he 
Amazon. J ames soon discovered that he was not destined to be 
a field na.turali st but his association vvi th Agassiz~ like t hat 
wi t b Wym n~ ·as very valua.ble. Such associ a.tions gave hi m two 
char acteristics which became fixed elements in his nature, "A 
respect for f acts nd for the mast ery of first-hand observa-
tions.111 
In arch 1866 J ames resumed his edical studi es , first at 
the ~ias sachusetts General Hospi t 2.l and then a t Harvard '-edical 
School again. Apxil 1867 found him on his way to Euxope ~ his 
xeasons being hec>.l t h , experiment .1 physi ology, and the Germa,n 
l anguage . The next yea.r and a ha.lf wa.s a p eriod of i ndecision 
and discouxagement 8.nd was spent mainly in Dxesden a.nd Berlin. 
But it vras at t he same time a period of efflorescense. He rea-
lized th2"t he wa,s not physically able to meet the de mands of 
l abora.tory resea.rch in pbysiology so he spent his time r eading 
widely in science and in Germa.n li tere.t ure , and in visiting 
galleries . This scattering of interests and his unstable hea.lth 
deepened t he philosophical intere st s to which he was predis-
posed by temp erament. 
In November 1868 J ames returned to Cambridge. The follow-
ing June he obtained his medical degree . A long period of ner-
vous depression Etnd ill-health followed. VIhich, as usual, bore 
I 
fruit for him. His interest clearly was in the biological so~-
ences but his weak eyes and back forbade using a microscope or 
1. 'ialone, DAB , IX, 591. 
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spending long hou rs in a l aboratory. A cri sis occurred in t he 
mi dst of this ner iod ~hich was in part intellectual, in part 
neurast henic . Philo sop hic doub t and mel anchol i a. l eft h i :n . The 
fo:rmer effect wa.s t he result of reading Charles Renouvier ' s 
Trc-d t e de Psychologie Rationelle. This converted him to a be-
li ef in moral freedom as an hypothesis to use C?.s a basis of 
a ction. 
iv . Teaching. In t he f all of 1872 J ames began his in-
structorship in physiology a t Harva rd College. For ten yee.rs 
he t aught compara.tive anatomy , co :apa:re.tive physiology , and hy-
g i ene . This, st range as it se ems , was in continuity with his 
genera l development . At t his time Herbert Spencer was in vogue, 
and biologic ~ l science was closely connected with both philos o-
phy and psychology . The central topic in biology was the t he-
ory of evolution. Thi s raised the issue of philosophica.l ma-
terialism an d J ames ' s a c quaintance ~ i th both b iology and. phi-
losophy resul ted in a course on t he "Philosophy of : Evolution" 
which was inauguratec1_ in 1879. Psychology was receiving 
fresh impulse from t he physiology of the senses and • ervous sy-
stem. Both of these top ics were especially emphasized by J ames 
in his studies and t eaching . Hi s a tt ention h1:1.d alrea.dy been 
dra.wn to t hem by Hel mholtz and Wundt in Germany in 1868 . A 
course entitled "Relat i ons between Phy-siology and Psychology" 
was announce for gradua te5 in the f all of 1875. In 1877 these 
courses were transferred to the depar t!~ent of phi lo s ophy . Three 
years l a t er J ame s was also transferred and became assistanJG pro-
fessor of philo sophy. Philo sophers of t h e older school viewed 
' 8 
C\ 
with some suspicion this new departure of teaching physiolog ical 
or biological psychology . J ames , in connection with these 
courses , created the first Amer ican l abor tory of psychology . 
During this and the following year G. Stanley Hall studied at 
Ha:rvard unde:r Bowditch and James. Hall l e,ter founded the lab-
ox to:ry at John Hopkins University . 11 Th:rough the i nfluence of 
James and Hall , and t hat of t he con~mpo:rary Ger:nan movement 
upon visiting Ame:r ican students , psychological l abora to:ries 
began to multiply rapidly in the United States towa:rd l89o.nl 
+ 
James continued to teach at Harva rd dur i ng t he ac a.de~nic 
years and used his sum.rners for travelling 8.nd lecturing . He 
taught philosophy until 1889 when he was transferred to t he de-
partment of psychology. Eight years l ater , in 1897 , he be~an 
to teach philo sophy again and continued to do so for ten years . 
By 1902 his Harvard teaching had been limited to a single course , 
which g ve him more t i me for his incessant reading , writing , 
lec tur i ng , and vol"..1lilinous correspondence . He met his last cla ss 
on January 22 , 1907, thus ending his thi:rty-five years of teach-
i ng c;t Ha.rvard. 
v . Later Life. It was not w1til July 10, 1878 that Jame s 
mc:..:rried. The wit and beauty of his wife, Alice Howe Gibbens , 
and the security and companionship of his family life , had much 
to do with the fruitful ness of his l ater years. She gave birth 
to five children , one of whom died in childhood . Three sons 
and a daughter , hovrever , lived to survive James . From 1890 to 
1909 J ames travelled extensively and lectured a great deal. In 
1. ~ alon e , DAB, IX, 592. 
9 
1884 James took part in the formation of the American Society 
for Psychical Research and for some years aided in its investi-
gations. He attended the philosophical congress in Rome in 
1905 and became aware of his growing fame. During the later 
years of his life many honors were bestowed upon him. He re-
ceived many honorary degrees at home and abroad. He was elect-
ed to the Prussian Academy of Science and to the French Academy 
of Moral and Political Sciences.l His cardiac troubles returned 
in the spring of 1910. A trip to England failed to improve his 
condition. He returned home in mid-summer and went to his coun-
try home in Chocorua, New Hampshire. He died shortly thereafter 
on August 28, 1910. 
10 
vi. Philosophical Background. A complete account of James's 
philosophical development would have to begin with his student 
years in Germany when he studied under such men as Ernest Mach 
and Carl Stumpf. Throughout this development the continual in-
fluence of the two motives of science and religion can be seen. 
James felt the appeal of both and felt that he had to provide 
for both. He had no sectarian affiliations even though he, for 
a time, regularly attended Harvard College Chapel. Institution-
al religion did not interest him, nor was he well acquainted 
with traditional theology. He did, however, feel the need of a 
faith but this was more in behalf of others then for himself. 
But, on the other hand, his training was in science and he was 
greatly influenced by it in his younger days by such men as Jef-
fries Wyman, Louis Agassiz, and hie positivistic friend Chauncey 
1. Malone, DAB, IX, 593. 
Wright. 
James's rejection of both the pretensions and negations of 
science was his first step toward philosophy. He knew Spencer 
well but respected science too well to accept Spencer's meta-
physical stretchings of it. Spencer's works, which James ad-
mi~ed at first, "soon became source books for the illustration 
of philosophical error.nl James used science to free himself 
from scientific authority. 
Turning to philosophy, "he was confronted by two leading 
alternatives, the rationalistic-monistic way of Hegel and the 
post-Kantians, and the empirical-pluralistic way of Mill and 
the British Empiricists. 112 Two exponents of the former were 
well known by him, Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley. But though 
Hegelianism presented a problem which required years to answer, 
and though its influence was always present, James's tempera-
ment was empirical from the beginning. He felt, however, that 
Mill had gone too far and that he needed to be defended against 
himself. Mill's associationism was too much for James. What 
James wanted was a more empirical empiricism. He found the ba-
sis of such in Shadworth Hodgson's dictum that "realities are 
only what they are known as. 11 3 James adopted this as one of 
his philosophical axioms. He had become acquainted with Hodg-
son in England wh~e both had been members of a circle of em-
piricists which also included G. c. Robertson, James Sully; 
Leslie Stephen, Frederich Pollock, Edmund Gurney, and Henry 
1. Perry, TCJ, I, 475. 3. QUoted in Malone, DAB, IX, 594. 
2. Malone, DAB, IX, 594. 
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Sidwick. James rejected Hodgson's determinism and intellec-
tualism but profited by hie analysis of experience. 
Renouvier, like Hodgson, thought that the phenomena of im-
mediate conscious experience should be the concern of philosophy 
but, unlike Hodgson, believed in the freedom and efficacy of 
the will. Because of these two reasons James was attracted to 
him. Hume and Mill were valued by James because they felt that 
practical motives should help to determine belief. This opened 
the way for faith. Hodgson felt that faith provided access to 
an invisible world beyond matter. Renouvier used Kant as hie 
authority for a similar conception of faith but interpreted it 
more- radically. 
For Renouvier the first step in the cognitive life, as well 
as in the moral life, was to affirm one 1 s freedom. James re-
sponded to this challenge in 1870. James also responded to 
Renouvier 1 s pluralistic conception of nature which harmonized 
with the creativity and novelty implied by his doctrine of free 
will. It was his "prospect of a philosophy that should be at 
once empirical, metaphysical, coherent, and auspicious which 
saved James from hie doubts and convinced him that he had some-
thing to say to his day and generation.nl James rejected Re-
nouvier•s scholasticism but never forgot his deep indebtedness 
to him, an indebtedness which he acknowledged by dedicating to 
him his last systematic work, Sone Problems of Philosophy. 
Thus we can see in James the effort to synthesize empiri-
1. Malone, DAB, IX, 595. 
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cism nd voluntarism. But J ames 's concept ion was more radical 
t hen earlier empiricism and voluntarism. 11 He found experi ence 
to be a. ri cher and more adequate source of knowledge , and he 
found the will t o be i ts more fun damental and perv2.sive condi-
tion.ul This r adical emp iricism was exp:eessed in Cf he · ill i.Q. 
Believe in 1897. 
3. Literature 
In June, 1878 , J~~es contracted ~ith Henry Holt nd Com-
pany to prepare a book on psychology . Although The Pri nci~les 
of Psychology was not completed until 1890 , parts of it b egan 
to appeEr in various articles al mos t i wuedi a tely after t he pro-
ject was ~~dertaken . In Europe J ames was already known thr ough 
his arti cle s in t he Critique Philosonhioue in France , and in 
_ind in D~gland. His article s ~hich l a te r appeared in Psychol-
~ did much to make him better known in A erica . Some of the 
more important i de ~s presented in t hese art icles and in his t wo 
volume work were : (1) the human mind is essenti ally active 
and i nteres t ed (th i s is the key to his entire t hou0 ht), (2 ) 
t he very na tuxe of consciousness is causal, (3 ) the stream of 
consciousness is characterized by continuity, (4 ) the essen-
tial nature of emotion is the visceral and organic sensations 
which accompany it s expression.2 The remarkable success of the 
b ook i s due not only to t he new i eas presented in it but to the 
1. Malone, DAB, IX, 595 . On t his aspec t of J ames see Bright-
man's ar ticle entitled "The Versatile J ames in Rel. Life, 12 
(1942-1943 ), 9-20. It clearly br ings out J ame s rel a tion to 
Renouvier and to Bowne. 
2 . !a lone, DAB , IX, 593. 
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fact that it summed up the state of psychology at the end of 
the nineteenth century. James broke with the past and with 
philo-sophy, declaring that psychology was henceforth a special 
science. 
In 1892 James published an abridged from of his Psychology 
(Psychology: American Science Series, Briefer Course) which 
was the most popular teztbook on the subject in America for 
many years. Another book on psychology (Talks to Teachers on 
- -
Psychology) which was published in 1899 helped to spread his 
ideas rapidly and also greatly stimulated the new subject of 
educational psychology. 
In 1897 The !l!i ~ Believe was published. These essays 
on radical voluntarism were published intermittently from 1879 
on and were anticipated in Psychology. The most significant 
of these essays for understanding James's philosophy as a whole 
is 11 The Sentiment of Rationality" which dealt with the purely 
theoretical or logical impulses which comprise the opposing 
passions for simplification and for making distinctions. The 
articles fall naturally into three groupe, those, namely, "which 
deal with fideism, with pluralism, and with individualism. Fide-
ism touches theory of knowledge, pluralism metaphysics, and in-
dividualism ethics, but in all three cases the personal and 
practical accent predominates. 11 1 
James had begun to collect material on the psychology and 
philosophy of religion as early as 1897 with the Gifford Lee-
1. Perry, TCJ, I, 209. 
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tures at Edinburgh in mind. The two series of lectures preEent-
ed were published in 1902 under the title The Varieties of Re-
- - ----
ligious Experience. Its primary intention was scientific~ his 
desire being to devote equal attention to the philosophical a.nd 
psychological aspects of religion. However, its philosophical 
implications are its chief significance. An empiricist looks 
to experience for knowledge and James implies that 11 religious 
experience" is the source of religious knowledge. The Varieties 
shifted the emphasis in the psychology of religion from a study 
15 
of 11 the dogmas and external forms of religion to the unique men-
tal states associated with it; and (did much) to strengthen the 
opinion that there is a religious experience sui generis~ who-se 
noetic claims deserve a respectful and sympathetic oonsideration. 11 l 
The next few years were very active and frui~ful and were a 
period in which James travelled considerably. In Janua~y 1906 
he was at Standford University where he gave the lectures which 
he later expanded and revised. These were published posthumously 
under the title Some Problems Q!Philosophy. Memories and 
Studies describes his experience of the suffering and heroism 
in the California earthquake of 1906. The series of lectures 
he published in the years 1904 and 1905 comprise the major part 
of Essays in Radical Empiricism~ also published posthumously in 
1912. In this volume James expands his idea of consciousness 
as a relation instead of as an entity. This is one of his most 
original and most significant philosophical contributions and 
1. Malone, DAB~ IX, 597. 
dea.lt a decisive blow to Cartesian dualism.l 
The culmination of these active and fruitful years was 
the publication of Pragmatism in 1907. It consisted of a series 
of lectures given at Columbia University that same year and at 
the Lowell Institute the preceding year. The central idea of 
pragmatism is that the meaning of an idea consists in the par-
ticular consequences to which it leads. The great controversy 
which arose when this volume was published resulted in numer-
ous articles and letters by James in which he defended his po-
sition. These were later collected and published in ~Mean­
!!!E. !2!, Truth (1909). 
James gave the Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College~ Ox-
ford in May 1908 in which he systematically presented his meta-
physical position. The following year these lectures were pub-
lished under the name A Pluralistic Universe. Rejecting the 
Hegelian dialectical method and the absolute for the Fechnerian 
method of empirical analogy and free speculation~ James con-
cluded that beyond man's consciousness there is a larger con~ 
sciousness with which man 1'e consciousness is in relation. It 
is in this volume that James "speaks most explicitly of the 
union between empiricism and religion as inaugurating a new 
era for both religion and for philosophy."2 
1. 
2. 
James wrote many other articles during his lifetime~ the 
On this point of. E. Hall's articles entitled 1 William James 
as a Psychologist" in the volume called l!l Commemoration 
of William James: 1842-1942 (ed. H. M. Kallen~. 
Ferry, TCJ~ I~ 592. 
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/ 
· l ast of which appeared shortly before his death. It we.s an 
al't icle on Benjamin Bl ood entitled 11 A Plu:re.listic Mystic" (Hib-
beTt Journal, July, 1910). The following month J ames died at 
his country home in New Hampshire . 
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CHAPTER I 
JAU~St S APPROACH TO R!lLIGIOJ 
.tame ppx-oaohed religion S.n a d1ettnot1Ye · anne%'. lt le 
1 . . :tte.n't to note thie e.inoe 1 t 1ndt o tea the ~en ex- 1 trend of 
hta re11dou.s thought. We •hall now brletlr oonelder hie pe~ 
eonal, psyoholQgioal, and philoeophioal app~ chee to :r li-
g1ou• problema. 
1. PeJ"aond 
1. b2 rami sat BIJ.&s&.tl• :tn the Ittl•Si•t Jam. e ea 
the· followlDg statement: 
At the out•et • l't ttruok by one great partltlo!l 
which divtdee the :re11gioua field. on the one ide 
of tt 11 • inttltuttonal, oa the other ereonal re- · 
liglon. Aa • p, Sab :t&e~ eays1 one bl'anob of re-ligion keep a the divinity, another tee-pe man moat 
ln 'rtew • low in th~ae leotue• I p~Opoee t ·o igfto1"e 
th tnatitlltlonal bt-anoh entS.t-ely. to aa.y nothing 
of the tu:tcle11a.etto l Ot"g&nlsattotJ. . to oones.cter aa 
11 ttle · pos1tble the 171te~~at1o theology ud the 
ideal .bout the gode themaelTeei and to oottf1ne .,. ... 
aelt_ae1fa:t • I oan to pe~aona . :r ·ltgion pure cd simple. 
fhi ole t-ly ebowa tb :t Jaaea app:roaohed religion from th pe;r-
aon 1 point of Yi •· He re3 eotec! completely the app~oach ot 
tnet1tu,1onal :religion. The e•aent1al• of 1natitutlonal :reli-
c 
gion he liata al •wo):'ahip and eaor1f1ct. ptto.«edurea fo.:r wo:tk• 
ing on the d1apoe1tlon.a of the de1tJ, theology nci o 2>emoay 
and ccleataettoal oJtgan1zat1on.•2 r%0.DI tbia polnt of 'Yiew 
:re11g1on l• tbe exte:rnal art of w1nnlng the :ravo'l' of the goda. 
\(\ 
J: es waa ~ot interested 1Jt suoh tbingt., Hta inte21eat waa 1a 
the inner- dlepoe1 tlona of !JIE!t1 · h1JDae1:t·, 1~ hie con olence, hta 
de rte, h!• helpleaane•s, h1e lnoomplet«tne•. . Aoco%d1ng to . 
this "rtew of ~e11glo:o the taTOl' ot God (not· of the god. ) and 
theology <toea play . . 1'1 tal part but the aotlona PJ'OIIPt$c1 by 
th!a tore ot :religion are pe~•on 1 and . ttqt ntua11t~1o •. . The 
. . . .. . ' ' .... 
entire eocleet etlca.l organ1~at1on tr1.th ita pxoieeta and aa .. 
~ enta nd oereiDOny and all othel' go-betweene al'e of aeoond• 
e.ry tmportanoe. Each lndS:rtdua1 tl'aneaots his own bueine• 1J'1 
pe~aon . .J"ellglou. ''the ~el :tion go•• dt.J~•ct tr.oa hea~t to 
heart:a fl'o· aoul to soUl, between Ill and hte aaker.•l 
lir ·l!t.IQPii itli1,9A' Hgrf l)la~Rtl\ltl• J e•· r allt•d 
that IWlT would ditput hi•. ~lal• tb t peracm 1· r ltgton 1.s 
. ost ba .1o. ea.Jlng that · it 11 only the unorganiaed. !Udlment . of 
.,. 
tt 11gloi1 and·· better oalled. o,.-al.tty o:r , ooneoieno~.~ · · u.ob pe:r-
•one ~uld ~e~ud per. on&l. religlen &e too ~oo~~pletM. a th1D.g 
. to be called ~eltgton. · 'fbe word •religion" · 'WOuld. •be -l!'eaenect 
tor tb Ml.r ot.tganlsed yatem of ftellng. t'ho~bt., and 1n.e.t1-
. . ' . 
tutton, 'fo'Ji tbe ·Ohtt.roh.,. tn aho:rt .. of wb1oh thia pe!'aon 1 ~eJ1-
gton~ . ao. called, is bu.t traot1ons.1 element.-•2 
1 ee ~eplt·es b7 laying that the per onal religion whioh 
he propo" to d1sou.•s od be called by almost anr name. !he 
name t• DOt neuly ae lapol"tant a• the phenomenon itaelf. Be 
belie•••• howeYe!', that rellgioue exper1enoe oontaine eoae el-
ement• wh1oh IIO!'e.lity does not.. Aa proof• of hi a contention. 
1. iam••• VRE, 39. 3. James, VRE, 29. 
lt 
() 
? 
tb t :pe:r•® 1 ~el1g1on ,te more fundament.al t~en t neolog_io •·· or 
' . 
... olesd.aet1c 1 religion he ape.aka of tbe. toun«e!'e -of the 
.. 
ohUttch e~ '!'he origin of thet.,r po•el' 1• • thtlf d1l'eot peJ>sonal 
• r • • 1 • 
· oo · . 1on lth the d1'Y1ne" wbe~eae th. cbuoh •11Ye.a . t tecond-
• • ' 1 ' 
h nd unon t:t dlt1on.•1 Tht·e i>Pliee not only to th.Oae be o 11• 
. ' . .. 
t ·he 1uperhU~Da& tc3und t.,.....the Qhr1n,. t.he ~4d · • o~t-.bui 
. to 1 _the o~i~tn .tor• of Cbr1. ·ts.an eect•• •.so . peJeQ!it\1 1" 11-
g io.Q 1hould •~111 th -n110rd1 -~ . thl 1 n:e.n . to th"Qe .. wbo 
• ! ' . • 
. . l&l.: . BtiuLW!t~ l$1a$&ta :%tl -- _rsaa• At. Rtl&s&.Qa• . 1 . _. •• 
. b_e11.necl . tb~t tb _'ZiJ wa~ "·. ~~nab 4•ttnt:•e .-el~tlonetd:p ~ 
' I ' ' ' . ' ' ·· ' ' ' ' 
t we _ n _the two tone of. rellg1on. 1'h1• ia -.cte ole r 1a the 
• ' • . ~ ' . . . • ., r . ' ·. ' ' ' ' ' . . ' . • . . ' ' 
Yu1tlitf, ,ft..e~ b s ,.., . . 
;b•r- oan be no doU;b\ th . t · at a u-tte~ . t te.ot · a ]lle-
11g-1oui .111 •· _ ·_ · lui1•ely pu;r1ued; do•• t 'tm.4 ·'to lll&ke -c1o~ 
.. ... reon •xoept1on~ an(! .too•nt:rlO•. % ~eat. not .-no• . 
·at .,o_ :~··np• ~"-~· .• ,,_ ollo•_~-- th• ~--~ -f-----·of . a ... oountr-J't ~betbe!:-. lt , · · • · • · _ . . • an1. or lloha.eaan~ B11 !'e11g1on 
hat been Jaade tor hia by otheJ:e, co~oated to ,.hta bt , .:ra41tloa .• 4e,e:nd.ne4 to f't*•4 to'f!ll br la1te.tlon; 
and rot 1ne.d br hab1 t.. l\ would Pt"Oft• .ua .llt-.le 'o 
etudJ tti1. · ~ wtilft· ..  ·~ mak6 
•e oh ratbetrt . ,or · • 1...:~,;_, _ :L.,_;.J!IIU whiob 
we:re the Jafl!!i!r11f!ft•-o ·. .l _ t . • ••• of IU8- · · g ted fe-~.Dg ·&a ~~«a• cl oonduot.. '~•• expert~ 
enoea we oa~ only f1D4 1a SadlYld~le to~ whoa te-
llgiott exteta •' a• a d'I.Jll he.b1t; bUt •• • .cut• 
f«'f ·1' tr:aihe:r~ · BUt uoh ltldtvi4u ·11 a~e •·sfli'llil• · ill th %el1gt.oue llll •' · ~v · ·· - · 
H :r - Ja.ra a ole 1f-1Y b:ting . out . the oollth. t bet een th . •o.~t­
nur J:elt.g1ous . bel1e"''er• W1 th hie • oon•entton l obaenancea• 
... 
and •aeooncl•haJld 2!$l1g1on" and the ·•gentu.e_ee•. wt th th tr ·"o~1g. 
1 1 es:pe:d.eno~••• · ho a!'e tbt "patt.ern.- tte~ -~ . tor ot.he:re. 
He:r 1s ·t,.mpl.iect J.ame • • aaQUJ~ptlon tb :t ·fol'J.I81 :rel1g1oa t . -· 
born in the '. Oot~aoi.outn •• ot a re:11g1oua genlus and find . ttl 
f:laal. lld1:t1•' ti.ot1 ·in eooleelaetlo1 · ·and · os,asaniSJe.d :reltg!oll. 
Thl• not 11een t t ,.. 1' 1181o~ b$.• tta aovoe la the i'i!> 
eon 1 :· xpenenc,e of :re1tgt0\a.; ~Qlu•e • . Xn ·· tbe . :~»•• · C{UOta-
t ion .tame a 1 s · c)C) -1ng · the ordin&.l'Y · reltg1~u. bell · r w1 t · 
t b. · religicme -· ;tentqa• ·I• .b t · ea ·tht• two en:re ·ea J'e . anr 
.erean. wb~ ~~~re. · r llg_1oue •-· e~~eno~_ . ~~t _. '!\~s. . lltP r1e11 *' 
a r · not at:rong · enough o:r p . -~ · et..• llough ... · · Th y u.ndoubte<!1y 
-r of ·., lue '~• :the pereone - lllllll~~tdi te-l.y · oonQerne!d and o slbly 
to a.. few_ 'the2n -.leo.. But tbeJ 1 ok tba' de · · :r oon•1ctlon of 
the e~ neno••• of the :e11g1ou pnlu ·1111at J.~e.ul te ln em o-
. ' . . . . 
ti • . :rogr tct lti.:t111 others · W1 th i'tll l ou ·· belief. 
'l'hl. _ ~~e~antlol\_ that tom.! ~•1t.gton · t .~m . tn the oon• 
•otousn ae of n ,Jeltgiout geniua and .f1nd• 1t• fin 1 •ol1d1:tt-
• • > ' • • • • • ' •. • • . a. . . 
o t1on tn-e. ol•~•t ot1olem and o%gaa1sed religion baa · f~reaoh· 
ing a1gn1f1ouoe. · xt ·1 be.. ed ~ bta Y1 tb t •rel.igtowa es-
pe:rienoe ·baa all 9Eki.Mii:Q ohU ote.t- a.n<l tuuotton.•l I' 1a 
·1 tb th1 oonae1ptlou t,n 1nd 'bat Jarae• l'ead ·tb. hletory of 
r l1glon and· bE• · n ·. 4 l t . · in . such a w 1 that he :• · .. • hi a oonoep-
tlon xe llfl~~d. lie ,.. • . ll•ed that · 4evelo :ent tn th _ o · G-. 
. i te <h.ftGt1on hat el.eo t . ken lace· 'ft. thln · o~ ts d re11g1on. 
The entire de•olop ent ·of Oh1'1.et1 )!11 ty f~o 0 tbelicieli to 
- . . 
.· !iP-L/tl& " J ~t !: ·t : ··· i~ '" .iG . Eit 't..,.. 
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tu,the:ra.nl 1 tc). C lrtnis -• to leel.eya.niem l towal."d the 1 ea · 
"of en i .· d1 ~~e sp1r1 tual help» experienced b1 the 1nd1Yldu l 
"n his fo,.lornJless and standing in no eaaent1 1 need of oct:t1• 
nal a.:r~tus nr l'Oplti ..;.tory maohine::t.,.J.t And t hl . 1 the 
tru 1 a1 of · i~eligionl. 'o restore r&l1g1oue experienc · an to 
eriognize lt aut the t•fi.ence of religion. 
a. Payobologtoal 
Jamee conitldered pel"aon 1 religton to be bae1c~ His m t~ 
od of approaoh 'o pe!'tonal religlol) wet now be considered~ 
1.• . MQ;,:e . ~ihiQ . .J:iai Re•iziati~s;,. Jaaea waa not only train-
ed in tlle t1 ld oi pqaholog~ but . taught 1 t at Harta:td Ooll.ep 
f:r:o 1889 to lmw.a He approached religion frO. the aide ot 
t he indi'fldue.l bu• thougb~ l t futile to t}lf to· itate the es•enc• 
of :teligton ia a •impie d ftn1 tioo~ 1'he n ·e~oua and widely 
different d•ttn1tlona dl proY that ~el1g1on 1 a aingle prln-
. . 
c1 1 . o» asencse. Rather 1t t• a oolleot1v~ n e~ To . tte~~p\ 
. . . 
simple 4•f1~~t1on reaul'ta onlJ in one•sl ed theo:rte.s , · 11 of 
which are 1nad41quate io the compiex1 ty of rellgiou .. expert nee.= 
A 1m11!l' eitwttton eueta in regard 'o ,.-e11g1oua eentit~ent. 
Dit:t'et"ent authc•~s ba•e llied 1 t to the feelin ·of dependenee;' 
te -:r, the ae.UEu Ufe,- a feelt.ng of the inflnUte •· end so forth. 
In•te d of beltLg one ipeo1f1o thing it 1e t ·tbe~ •colleot1"te 
nue for the DULnf een:timent• wh1o1l religioua Objects m y arouee 
aa 
in altemation .• •l In religion we have such sentiments as lo•e• 
fear, 3oy, and awe. But religious love 1• only •man•a natur 1 
e · tion of lov~~ directed to a religious object. w2 Likewiae for 
fe r, joy, awe.. and the other emot1ona. J ea repudiat all 
one-tided theoJtties in favor of an eap1:t1oa.l approach to reli-
gion. By empij~ioal be meana more than juat a deeo:rlptive su:r-
vey of rellgi~La manifestation. Thia ae ma to be the oaee hen 
he speaka of •1:he purely exiatential point of view from hioh 
in th followix~ leoturea the phenomena of religious experience 
must be conaid~tred. •! The aame view 1a p:re .ented ben he aaya 
t hat •to t h pElyebologtat the religious propensities of 
muat be t lea1wt ae intereating aa any oth r of the t ota er-
tain1ng to hie ental oonat1tut1on. It ould seem, therefo:re• 
that; ae a paye~hologiat, the natural tblng for me uld be to 
invite you to a. deaoriptive survey of those religious propen-
aitiee. •4 
&i• _ Op;oeatsl n _ib sub~totivt fll•DPI'AI• That James waa 
oonoerned with eomething more tban a atr1otly desorlpt1Ye eur-
yey is made clear when he aa.ye: 1 If the inqUiry be psyoholog1-
oal, not. religioue inatitutione, but !'ather 1"e11g1oue feelinga 
and rel1glou• 111l'PU1••• lllUst be 1 ts eub3ect • and I wet confine 
myself to those mo:re de1'e1oped aubjeot1Te phenomena recorded in 
liter ~u:re prod~oed by articulate nd tully alef-oonsoious men, 
1n worke of piety and autobiography. "5 It ls the 11 eubjeot1•e 
1. Jamea, VRI, 27. 
a, Jamea, VRE1 37. 
3, J ea, VRE, a. 
4, James, VRE, ~3. 
5. J ea, VRE, 3. 
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pheno. ena,lt $x;p:reesed 111 •:religious feelinge 8.nd 'rel1g~ous t . 
& . . 
pulses which ~fan1ee p'!'od6'4a to · tudy in the YHJ.fZt,lt• :.. i:ret 
- of all M \inde:rtook .· . "Oirownsoripti.on of the 1'o :1o11 in leotu:ie 
t o . He l 'lmi t!!td hi field of in uiey by ruling out of his ooa-
side2' tion the enti~e 8.l' a of · pr!la1 tive :religion. He :t.elt t .. t 
·. ur kno 1 .dg • c)·:f' ·t e e Tli r atage of :rel1 ion is so im!)erfect 
and oonjeotur .:L that· f'urth~r d.leo't.ut.eion of it· 1fas not eapeo13.1-
ly . :rtlnrh11e•- t l · at au,tth d1aouesi-on -.as not orth ·htle 
in the a:rtiou~La.r . e1!'1ea o: lee:tu:ea in tl\1& tion. 
J s toolt pl'l' otl.cally all ot his mate~1 1 fr m Obr1 ·ttan 
eou:roe s . pd . e~L cte 1 t ln accorda.no . w1 tb hi a def1n1 t ion 1\lld 
t heory · 1· · eli ~ion • . J. ea•a· def1G1tion of ~&.11g1on i ; "'i!!Jl 
fetltM,a• Mil1t .A!¥1 e _ _ D:!DRII .at ,Wl.i•&JUliJ. .;a. !Jl1WU.I AQl.-
. 1tudt- . a W. · JW. itl!ftz &JJlU~;:QgwJ.: thoa;•tltAI a · llMA ·J.D. tela.~tsm 
.a . ~\I"Ql lW~ .JJ,U; S1QD1&4'1 i.1lA CU.X&Qt••l It W&B . th thi• 
efl~i tion in rrd.nd th . t he :p :roe..ohed 1 e i~!oal oba~rY t1one . 
Emil · utroux re lised tb!s ; 1\ he ~te: "lt ie not, the:r~­
tore; · simply . bt!eau · TJSYCholog1 te hie . · · o1a;l · ttttU! y; t t t be-
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CHAPTER II 
JAMES'S VIEW OF EXPERIENCE AND OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
In this chapter James's theory of religious experience will 
be presented. But first his general concepts of religion, ex--
perience, feeling, thought, and will must be presented. 
1. Nature of Religion 
Etymologically the word "religion" comes from the Latin 
religio or religare meaning 11 to bind." Generally speaking, the 
word can be defined either subjectively or objectively. In the 
former case it refers to 1 the experiences which arise out of 
man's conscious relation to some transcendent agent or agents, 
upon whose attitude toward him his welfare is believed in some 
measure to depend." In the la.tter case it is 11 the body of be-
liefs and practices which arise in connection with this experi-
ence, and which are ordinarily associated with some form of in-
stitutional life.•l 
i, Definition of Religion, James defines religion as 
"lli_ feelings, ~ and experiences .2! individual !!!.!.!!. ,!a. their 
solitude, .!2. far .!!!. they apprehend themselves !g, stand :!!! .I!t-
lation to whatever they may consider the divine.n2 In view of 
this definition it is quite obvious that James defines religion 
in a subjective manner. By this definition he arbitrarily lim-
i ted the field of his inquiry in the Ve.rieties but did so in 
accordance with his conception of what religion is in its inner-
1. Baldwin, DPP, II, 452. For a more extensive general defi-
nition see Hasting's Encyclopaedia~ Religion~ Ethics. 
2. James, VRE, 31. 
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most essence. He warns, however, not to take the word 11 divine 11 
in too narrow, or too broad, a sense. On the one hand there 
is Buddhism which, strictly speaking, i~theistic although in 
its popular form the Buddha takes the place of a God. On the 
other hand there is modern transcendental idealism which lets 
God 11 evaporate into abstract Ideality. 11 In Emersonianism, for 
example, God is the divinity i mmanent in all things, the spir-
itual structure of the entire universe. By the divine J ames 
means something which avoids the two extremes of 11 Emersonian 
optimism11 and "Buddhistic pessimism." Yet at first glance he 
seems to include these extreme views of the divine inasmuch as 
their exponents have experiences worthy to be called religious 
and respond in ways similar to those of the highest Christian 
responses. 
James continues by analyzing the result of including the 
extreme views of the divine in his definition. He feels that 
the term "godlike," if treated as such a general quality, be-
comes exceedingly vague for many gods with discrepant attributes 
have flourished in the history of the rade. By the word lldi-
vine" he means "not merely the primal and enveloping and real 11 
but llonly such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled 
to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse or a 
je·st.nl He felt that the former definition was too broad and 
needed restriction. His definition rest r icts it but yet is 
broad enough to include the area intended by his definition of 
1. James, VRE, 34-38. 
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religion. 
ii. Basis of Religion . In a letter of Miss Frances R. 
Morse on April 13, 1900 J ames stated the problem he had set for 
himself in his Gifford lectures: 
u First, to defend (against all the prejedices of my 
ilclass 11 ) 11 exoerience 11 against 11 philosonhy11 as beinP-" 
the real backbone of the world's religious life--I0 
mean p:rayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing 
immediately and privately felt, as against high and 
noble general views of our destiny and the world's 
meaning ; and second, to make the hearer or reader 
believe , what I myself invincibly do believe, that, 
although all the special manifestations of religion 
may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theo-
ries) , yet the life of-it as a whole is mankind's 
most important function.l 
James regarded 11 experience" as the rea.l basis of religion. He 
stated this point of view in the personal letter quoted above 
but nowhere did he explicitly express it in the Gifford lec-
tures. Perhaps he felt that a direct expression of it was not 
necessary. All that was necessary was to quote nmnerous exam-
ples of the manifestation of religion in experience. This he 
did throughout the entire series of lectures. 
In the above quotation is i mpiliied James's belief that ex-
amples of the manifestation of personal religion were the best 
defense of his theory of religious experience. He largely ap-
peals to the individual's private experience of 11 prayer, guid-
ance , and all that sort of thing imraediately and privately 
felt.n2 He supports his theory not by arguments but by the 
records of the personal experiences of many persons. The va-
lidity of his identification of religion with religious expe-
1. J ames, LWJ, II, 127. 2. James, LWJ, II, 127. 
32 
/! -:, 
' I 
rience will depend upon his conception of religious experience. 
As Moore points out, 11 if the experiential point of view of re-
ligion is to be maint a ined an adequate theory of religious ex-
perience is dernanded. 11 1 But before we investigate James 's the-
ory of religious experience,the meaning he attributed to expe-
rience must be analyzed. 
2. Nature of Experience 
i. Psvchological Foundation~ J ames laid the foundation 
of his theory of experience in his Psychology. Two distinct 
t heses are advanced in this work and can be traced throughout 
the entire t wo volumes. John Dewey has pointed out the exist-
ence of these two theses. 
The one is a re-interpretation of introspective psy-
chology , in whi ch James denies that sensations, im-
ages , and ideas are discrete and in which he repl aces 
them by a continuous stream which he calls the ' stream 
of consciousness.• The other aspect of his Princi-
ples of Psychology is of a biological nature. It 
shows itself in its full force in the criterion which 
James established for discovering the existence of 
mind. 1 The pursuance of future ends and the choice 
of means for t heir attainment are thus the mark and 
criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenom-
enon . 2 
These t wo theses lead in auite different directions . Several 
.. 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in James's philosophy are due 
to his failure to make this distinction explicit. The former 
is "a source of his radical empiricism and realism, the latter 
of his anti-intellectualism and pra.gmatism. 11 3 
1. Moore, TRE, 7. 
2. Dewey, PAC , 28. Also in his CAP, 23-24. The quotation 
from James is from PSY, I, 8. 
3 . Moore, TRE, 8. 
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When James studied psychology the prevailing concept of 
consciousness was that it was a e:ynthetic product, its various 
states being built up by the association of discrete elements. 
British empiricism, especially Hu.me 1 s, was the source of this 
concept. According to Hume all perceptions were distinct, there 
being no real c.onnectione among them. This view provided no 
real basis for knowledge. This awakened Kant from his dogmatic 
slumber ru1d he proceeded to search for an adequate basis for 
knowledge. He found it in a~ a priori factor which imposed cer-
t a in categories on experience. Experience was thus not a chaos 
of discofu~ected impressions as Hume believed. It was ordered 
by t he categories of the mind. Later idealists developed this 
theory into the doctrine of an Absolute Mind. This Absolute 
was the ground of both the order of the universe and the order 
of experience . l 
ii. Definition of Experience. J ames revolted against all 
such ideas . He did believe that experience was ordered but not 
by an .Absolute Mind. His solution was presented in his Psy-
chology. 
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself 
chopped up in bits. Such words as 1 chain 1 , or 
'tra in' do not describe it fitly as it presents 
itself in the first instance . It is nothing 
jointed; it flows. A 1 river 1 or a •st r eam' are 
the metaphors by which it is most naturally de-
scribed. In talking of it hereafter , let ~call 
it the stres.m of thought, of consciousness, .2:£. of 
subjective life .2 
This is his basic principle. James then proceed's to give a 
1 . Moore , TRE, 8-9. 2. J ames , PSY, I , 239. 
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psychological description of the subjective flow of conscious-
ness. He compares it to the life of a bird which consists of 
an alternation of "flights" and "perchings." The "flights" of 
the stream of consciousness are filled with "thoughts of rela-
tions, statio or dynamic" whereas: the "perehings" are occupied 
with "sensorial imagination of some sort.nl The former he calls 
the "transitive parts," the latte!r the "substantive parts." 
The "substantive parts" are surrounded with a "fringe" and con-
nected by the "transitive parts." 
This clearly shows that James aligns himself with the em-
piricists but he revise9 and expands their meaning of experi-
ence. Experience is an organic unity and not just an aggregate 
of psychological units. 1 In the stream of consciousness, re-
lations and connections are appre:hended as well as separate 
terms, and appreciations and choices are interwoven with our 
sensations and perceptions."2 
James did not conceive of the ~ind as a passive recipient 
as did Locke. It was not a tabula rasa upon which experience 
wrote. The mind was rather an active experienoer which not 
only was senstiive to the world but which went out to explore 
the world in a selective, dynamic way. Mind, for James, was 
essentially originative and creative. He emphasized facts as 
over against mere theories but held that "without the origi-
native power of the mind we should not discover many facts and 
that by the initiative of the mind facts may be remolded.n3 
1. James, PSY, I, 243-245. 
2. Lyman, Art.(l942), 243. 
3. Lyman, Art.(l942); 243~ 
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In personal experience reality, to some extent, is in the mak-
ing. 
There are many important im±:•lications of James• s concep-
tion of experience. It is the pe1ychological foundation of his 
doctrine of radical empiricism. It implies that there are no 
separable mental elements of any form whatsoever. It results 
in the belief that religious experience has no specific reli-
gious emotion as its distinguishing essence.l 
111. Definition of Feeling.. The two tendencies which 
persist throughout the PsychologY result in ambiguities in the 
use of the term 11 feeling. 11 At d:1.fferent times James means dif-
ferent things by it.2 The popular definition of feeling as 
pleasant or unpleasant sensations is, however, never used by 
hiW. In Psychology when James was stating his theory of the 
stream of consciousness, he used feeling very broadly as a col-
lective term for mental states ir.L general. In discussing the 
question of nomenclature he defines feeling in this broad man-
ner. "But if the connections makes it clear that mental states 
at large, irrespective of their kind, are meant, this will do 
no harm, and may do some good. 11 3 James realizes that two 
classes of readers will be startled by such a definition, those 
who equate feeling with sensation and the platonizing thinkers 
who emphasize reason. But James felt that the term 11 feeling" 
best characterizes mental states or consciousness in general so 
that is the term he used. 
1. Moore, TRE, 10. In ERE James revises his definition of ex-
perience and arrives at his conception of pure experience. 
2. Moore, TRE, 13. 3. James, PSY~ I, 186-187. 
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James proceeds to analyze the stream of consciousness and 
to distinguish the transitive and substantive parts. When once 
this distinction has been made James employj(s the word "feeling" 
in a different way. Instead of using it to 1~efe :r to mente,l 
states in general, he uses it to me~n the transitive parts of 
the stream of consciousness. At the same time he uses the word 
11 thoughts 11 to mean the substantive parts of the subjective life 
or stream of thought. In speaking of the tra.nsi ti ve p-arts of 
the stream of consciousness James ss.ys: 
As a snow.flRke cryst al caught in the warm hand is no 
longer a drystal but a d1·op, so, instead of catching 
the feeling of relation moving to its term, we find 
we have caught some substantive thing, usually the 
last word we' were pronouncing, sta_.tically taken, and 
with its function, tendency, and £articuiliar meaning 
in the sentence quite evaporated. 
E.ven though James usually prefers feeli ng for the trs_nsi-
tive states and thoughts for the substa.ntive parts, he sometimes 
uses these t wo terms inconsistently. For example, he says that 
the resting-pla,ces or substantive parts, are "usually occupied 
by sensorial imagination of some SOJI't, whose pecula.ri ty is that 
they can be held before the mind for a.n indefinite time, and 
cant empla.ted without changing" and the places of flight or 
transitive parts are 11 filled with thoughts of relations, static 
or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters 
contemplated in the periods of comparative rest • 11 2 
When James was thinking in terms of the biological tendency 
he more clearly distinguished thought and feeling. Feeling them 
1. James, PSY, I, 244. 2. James , PSY, 243. 
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becomes synonymous with intuitive experience. It is this mean-
ing which predominates in ~ El~ ~ Believe and in Varieties. 
In both volumes James's emphasis upon feeling is exceedingly 
strong. 
When James defines feeling as immediate intuitive experience 
he includes not only sensation but emotion, desire, etc. At 
times in~ !!!i~ Believe James speaks as if all reason does 
is to find reasons for that which is immediately felt. "The 
Sentiment of Rationali ty11 especi1:tlly emphasizes the role of 
feeling and the emotions and how such subjective factors de-
termine our views of life. This emphasis carries over to the 
Varieties where the question of faith and reason is d~scussed.l 
In such discussions the theory of feeling as intuitive experi-
ence appears time and time againu MacLeod has pointed this 
out. In reference to James he says: 
Feeling is deeper than intellect, the 'deeper source 
of religion 1 ; religion is no s.econdary product, but 
a way of feeling or action with its own independent 
evidence. There is a 1plui, a thisness, which feel-
ing alone can answer for•. 
iv. Definitign of TbQught. The chapter on "Conception" in 
Psychology is illustrative of the biological tendency in James's 
thought. To him thought is not a mere contemplation of things 
but an activity operating on things. 11 The result of the 
thought's operating on the data given to sense is to transform 
the order in which experience comes into an entirely different 
1. 
2. 
RE Of. especially v~, 246 and 505-507. 
MacLeod, IPPJ, 122. QUotations from James are from VRE, 431 
and 455. In a latter volume (ERE) James expands the meaning 
of feeling to include such cognitive elements as the "feel-
ing of relation" and the "feeling of tendencyn which are 
basic concepts in his psychology. 
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order, that of the conceived worl d.nl Thoughts are the vehicles 
of conception. In speaking further on conception he stresses 
the essentially active nature of thought. "Each act of con-
ception results from our attention singling out some one part 
of the mass of matter for thought which the world presents, and 
holding fast to it without confuaion." 2 Conception is thus "~ 
function EL which ~ thus identif~ ~ numerically distinct ~ 
permanent subject 2! discourse.n3 It is a way of using a por-
tion of sensible experience. 
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In dealing with sensible experience reason performs a li~ 
ited but important service. Its function is to criticize and 
evaluate the data of experience. James conceives of reason as 
being interpretative in nature. In this sense reason is most 
necessary. James had little use for logical reason but did recog-
nize that a certain amount of abstraction is necessary in order 
to think at all. Percepts must be transformed into concepts 
but concepts are not universally valid. Their function is to 
lead back to the perceptual flux and to action. Concepts do 
perform a necessary service but cannot grasp or express the dy-
namic nature of existence.4 
This brings us to the reflective and teleological nature of 
thought. Since conception is a function, a way of dealing with 
our sensible experience, it is a teleological instrument. In 
the final paragraph of his chapter on "Conception" James says: 
11~ whole function ~ conceiving, 2[ fixing, ~ holding fast 
1. James, PSY, I, 482. 
2. James, PSY, I, 461. 
3. James, PSY, I, 461. 
4. MacLeod, IPPJ, 127-128. 
to meaning , ~ £2_ significance .§\P~"rt from the fact that the 
conceiver is §. cree,ture !.!1£ part~ nurposes and private ~.ul 
This state ent points ahea.d to his chapter· of rea.soning in which 
he develops h is concept t hat the only .ean ing or essence of 
thought is teleological . 
In analyzing the modes of conceiving J ames speak s of that 
fallacious thinking which s ays that there is no one quality which 
is ab solutely essential to anything . He points out t hat Locke 
undermined this falla .. cy and tha t none of his successors r eally 
esc-e.ped it or sa,w tha.t 11 t he .only meaning of essence is teleolog-
~' and that cla ssifica tion and; conception ~ -ourely teleo-
logice.l weapons of the mind. 11 2 J ames felt t hat t he essence of 
a thing II is that one of its properties whi ch is so L .1port ant for 
!El. interests tha t in compa.rison V."i th it I may neglect t he rest .n3 
Reasoning is r-.. lways 11 fox a subjective interest, to att a in some 
particular conclusion , or to g re.tify some special curiosi ty . 11 4 
It grasps t he data before it , bree.ks it up and concei vee it ab-
stra c-tly. It must conceive it rightly a"s well which met:m s con-
ceiving it by that pa.rticula.r abstra ct cha.ra,cteristic which will 
result in that goal which t he reasoner wishes to atta in . This 
necessit ate s acting upon t he particul a.r da ta before him. 11 My 
thi)t king i s fi:rst and last ancJ. always for the s ake of my doing . 11 5 
J ames's t heory of the nature of thought involves a theory 
of t he natu1·e of abstract ideas . In the chapter entitled 11 Nec-
1. J ame s , PSY, I, 482 . 
2. J ames , PSY, I, 335e 
4 . James , PSY , I, 338. 
5 . J ames , PSY, I, 333 . 
3. J ames, PSY , I, 335. 
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tl ' 
essary T:ruth and t he Effects of Experience , " J a ne s mainta i n s 
t he"t metaphysi cal , aest het ic , and ethicc;. l p:rinciple s , the l aws 
of s cience and logic , and t he elementary ment al c a t egol' ies a re 
a ccidental fo rms which man ha.s invente d and which he ma intains 
because of his applice.tion of them to concr et e e xperience . They 
are not due to t he cumul a tive effects of a l arge number of par-
ticul a.r experiences . They are postulated. by !'eason a.nd are not 
part of t he universe prior to being di scovered by reason. 
Here J a.mes i s f ar from t he older emoiricism. l The signific .nee 
of t h i s t b.eory has been summed up by Dewey . 
It i s t he refore not the or i gin of a concept , it is 
its application which bedomels t he criterion of its 
va lue ; a nd he:re we have t he whole of p r e.gmatism in 
embryo . A phrase of Jame s 1 s1 very well summarizes 
t he i mport : ' t he p opula r notion that "Science" is 
force d on t he mind ab extra , and t hat our interests 
have nothing tg do wi t h its construct i ons , is ut-
t erly absurd.. 1 ,.J 
The biological basis for t h i.s view of t hought i s found i n 
t he ess~tY entitled "Reflex Action and Theism. " 
The s t:ructul'c.l unit of the nervous system i s in f act 
s. tri ad , nei t her of whose elements has any independ-
ent existence . The sensory i mpress ions exist only 
for the sake of awakeni ng t he central process of re-
flection, and t he central p:rocess of reflection ex-
ist s only for t he sake of calling fort h t he final 
act . The willing department: of our na.t ure , in short , 
domine,te s both t he conceiving department and the 
feeling depart ment; or in pla i ner English , percep-
tion and t h i nking a re only t here for behavior ' s 
sake.3 . 
Here we have J ames ' s doctrine of reflex a ction ruLd his concep-
tion of the physiol ogy of t he nervous sys t em upon ·hich he built 
his t heory of t he n~:Jture of thought . 
1 . i.'!Ioore , TRE, 11-12. 
2 . Dewey , PAC , 29 . QUota tion fi·om J ames is from PSY , I, 667 . 
3 . J a,mes , WTB, 113-ll4:e 
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v . Definition of Will . 11 The willing depart ment of our 
n "' ture , in short , dor.1inates both the conceiving depart1t1ent EJ,nd 
t 'h_e .coL eel 4 ng de,...,~ ar+. r,1en+ . nl mh"s nru'""t be ai1"lyzed fur .... her - .J. y u-•· u J. ... 0 c- IJ ~ • What 
did J ames ~ean by will and what was i ts function i n e perience? 
In answering t h i s question Bertoc:ci 1 s articl e on 11 William J a es • s 
Psychology of Will : An Evaluation" has be en of gr ee,t value . 2 
In dealing with the problem of will i n his psychology, 
J ames di rects his attenti on l~rge:ly toward t he moral struggle . 
The essential nature of the will i s " act i on in ~ l ine of ~ 
great est resi stance . u3 J ames syrr.!bolizes the situation : I plus 
E i s greater than P. I represents the ideal i mpul ses which , ner 
~, are weaker than the instinctive or habitual propens i tie s 
(P) . ~ hen t he i deal i mpul ses a,nd. t he propensities conflict , E 
i s needed. E i s t he effort of will o:r 11 a.'>J. active force adding 
its strength to that of t he (ideal) moti;Tes . ·11 4 hen will is 
added to the ideal mot i ves the instinct i ve propensi t i es a.re over -
come . 11 Effort of attention ll th!!§. the essenti al -oheno enon of 
v;ill. u5 
Bertocci points out a. dist i nction which it is i mpo:rt ant to 
keep in mind . He differenti ates will- activity and will-pm~er . 
Will- activi ty is the volit ional eff ort which wills one alter-
nativ~ rather t hru1 another ; wi ll-power is the power of t he will 
to achieve its ends or purposes . The efficacy of the will de-
pends "not only on t he ins t r insic e xi s tence of will- activity , 
1.. J ames , WTB , 113-114 . 
2 . Bertocci , rt . (1946 ), 2-13 . 
4 . J ames , PSY, II , 548 . 
5. J ames , PSY, II , 562 . 
3 . James , PSY , I I , 548 . 
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but on the power of the psychical energies such as emotions 
and antagonistic associations at play in the mental field." 1 
The function of will is "to keep affirming and adopting 
a thought which, if ~eit to itself, would slip away. 112 This 
will be discussed later in this chapter under the relation of 
the will to religion. As Bertocci points out, sometimes "James 
speaks as if effort of will (fiat) and attending were completely 
congruous. n3 "Effort of attention !.§. thus the essential phe-
nomenon of will. 114 But when spea.king of the struggle of the 
self to keep an idea in mind, James introduces another aspect 
of will, namely consent. He says: "The effort to attend is 
therefore only a part of what the word "will" covers; it covers 
also the effort to consent to something to which our attention 
is not quite complete.u5 To attend to an idea is to fill the 
mind with it but consent must be added to attending to make 
sure that the idea will persevere. Consent is a second "stroke 
of ~ffort 11 which results in express acceptance of the idea. 
''Although attention is the first and fundamental thing in vo-
li tion, express consent i2, ~ ,!!ali ty 2!_ what is attended ~ 
is often an additional and quite distinct phenomenon involved.n6 
3. Analysis of Religious Experience 
James's view of religion and of experience has been outlined 
above. To summarize, James thought of experience a.s a whole as a 
stream of consciousness which floww continuously and which con-
1. Bertocci, Art.(l946), 4. 4. James, PSY, II, 562. 
2. James, PSY, II, 565. 
3. Bertocci, Xrt.(l946), B. 
5. James, PSY, II, 568. 
6. James, PSY, II, 568. 
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tains its own relations or trans:ltions between its more "substan-
tive" parts. He repeatedly emphasizes the primacy and importance 
of immediate experience. He stresses also the importance of the 
will and its controlling influenc~e. Somewhere within this total 
experience is that portion which can be abstracted out and la.-
belled "religious experience • 11 ~rhe problem now is to analyze 
this "religious experience." 
i. Relation to Experience at Large. The basis of James's 
entire psychology is his belief that experience is a continuum, 
not an associa.tion of distinct elements. This conception of 
consciousness is also the basis <>f his religious theories. He 
thus rejects the idea of a specific religious emotion or senti-
ment. James observes that in the psychologies and philosophies 
of religion many authors hold to a specific religious sentiment 
but that they do not agree as to what it is. 11 0ne man allies 
it to the feeling of dependence, one makes it a derivative 
from fear; others connect it with the sexual life; others still 
identify it with the feeling of the infinite; and so on.nl 
Such widely different conceptions. aroused doubt in James.' s 
mind that there is one specific religious sentiment. For him, 
the religious sentiment is nothing but a "collective name for 
the many sentiments which religious objects may arouse in al-
ternation."2 James is objecting to those who view feeling as 
distinct mental elements. As concrete states of mind which 
consist of feeling plus specific sorts of objects, religious 
experiences and religious states of mind can be distinguished 
from that larger experience and menta.li ty in genera,l. Just as 
1. James, VRE, 27. 2. James, VRE, 27. 
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there is no one basic religious emotion so James believes that 
there is probably no one specific religious object or specific 
religious act. 
As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious 
emotion, but only a common storehouse of emotions upon 
which religious objects may draw, so there might con-
ceivably also prove to be no, one specific and essen-
tial kind of religious object, and no one specific and 
essential kind of religious act.l 
Later in the Varieties James concludes that there is no specific 
religious object or act. 
Just as religious experience has no specific religious sen-
timent, so there is no characteristic psychological process 
which indicates the presence of religious experience. James 
directed this objection against those who believe that the es-
sence of the religious life is the unification of the self or 
some similar process. 
James devotes two chapters o,f the Varieties to the analysis 
of conversion and feels that there is a distinct process in-
volved by means of which the self is unified. But James denies 
that this prooess in a unique characteristic of religion. Re-
ligion and religious experience is often present when the pro-
cess is not. In answer to M. Murisier who believes that inner 
unification is the essence of the religious life, James points 
out that 11 §:!!. strongly ideal interests, religious or irreligious, 
unify the mind and tend to subordinate everything to themselves.u2 
Just because the psychiatrist has unified the self we cannot say 
1. 
2. 
James VRE, 28. Moore points out that James's theory of the uniqu~ness of religious experience is similar to R. Otto's 
but "does not abstract religious feeling from their object." 
James, VRE, 349, footnote. 
that his patient has undergone a religious experience. He may 
have but the chances are that he has not. 
This same argument was used by James to fight 11 against the 
commonly urged view that any supreme loya.l ty constitutes a re-
ligion.11 James was very much opposed to any such views which 
result in either an artificia.l restriction of religion or an 
extension of it beyond what is inwediately experienced to be re-
ligion.l A·s an example of the former he points to the lives of 
the saints who successively renounce amusements, conventional 
society, business, family duties and so on until at last they 
have complete seclusion. All thj.s is done in the name of inner 
purity. A young sister asks her Superior, 11 Is it not better that 
I should not speak at all during the hour of recreation, so as 
not to run the risk, by speaking,. of falling into some sin of 
which I might not be conscious?"~: His final answer to those 
who believe that religious experience has a characteristic state 
is contained in a footnote. "I 1;rust that the present work will 
convince the reader that religion has plenty of material content 
which is characteristic, and which is more important by far 
than any general psychological form.•3 
But how can we distinguish religious experience from expe-
rience as a whole and from other sorts or kinds of experience 
if there is not a characteristic psychological process or a 
distinct mental element to indicate its presence? James sug-
gests that we study those cases ~vhere the religious spirit is 
1. Moore, TRE, 29-30. 
2. James, VRE, 349-350. 
3. James; VRE, 349. 
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t{ "l 
unmistakable and very strong. 
The essence of religious experience ;'€, the thing by 
which we finally must judge them, must be that ele-
ment or quality in them whiClh we can meet nowhere 
else. And such a ouali ty w1.11 be of course most 
prominent and easy -to notice in those religious ex-
periences which are most onEl-sided, exaggera.ted, 
and intense.l 
As a result of his study of many such cases draWJD from all re-
ligions James finds that there is: a certain basic process in 
all of them and in this process e,ll religions tend to coalesce. 
James calls it a process of delivere,nce. This process consists 
of two parts , an uneasiness and its solution. Reduced to its 
simplest terms the uneasiness is "a sense that there is some-
thing wrong about ~ as we natur~J.ly stand. 11 The solution is a. 
11 sense that ~ ~ saved ~ the. wrongness by making proper 
connections with the higher powers . 11 2 
James points out that the wrongness takes on a moral char-
actei' ~nd the salvation a mystical tinge in the more highly de-
veloped minds. He then formulates the essence of religious ex-
perience in these terms. In so far as the individua.l suffers 
from his wrongness and criticizes it, he is, to that extent , 
consciously above it. And if anything higher exists he is £n 
at least possible touch with it. A~ong with the wrong aspect 
of the individual there is thus a better part . It is not ob-
vious at this stage with which part he ought to identify his 
rea.l being. But the individual identifies his real self with 
the higher , better part of himself when he reaches the second 
1. James, VRE, 45. 2. · James, VRE, 508. 
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stage, the stage of solution or e:alvation. He does t his in the 
following way: 
~ becomes conscious .ill:i 1£li s higher part is .£2.E:,-
terminous end continuous with a MORE o'f't!ie same 
auality, whlc'h is opera .. tiveTn-the uniVerse OU't'Side o 
of him, and whi"Ch he _m keep in working touch wi tli, 
and in 1! fashion ~ .2n, boa!:£ of a.nd ~ himself 
when all his lower being hae: gone to pieces in the wxeck:r- - - - - -
J ames believes that such simple terms not only accura.tely des-
cribe the religious experience ae. it actually is but a.lso pro-
vides for the divided self and its struggles , for the change of 
p ersonal center, for the surrender of the lower self , for the 
external power which aids in conversion , for the feeling of un-
i ty with t his higher power, for the feelings of security and 
joy , etc , which are nresent in some but not in all religious 
experiences. 
Having outlined the essence of religious experi ence the 
speci fic characteristics of the religious consciousness will 
now be discussed. James believed that such characteristics are 
abstractions but realized that a certain amount of abstraction 
is necessary if there is to be personal intercommunication . In 
view of this JaJnes felt that religious experience had two 11 die.-
tinctn characteristics. In explaining them he differentiated 
the religious and the moral consciousness . He differentiated 
these two particular aspects of ex~erience in as much as they 
are so similar that they are often confused. 
First of all,the religious consciousness is characterized, 
1 . J ames, VRE, 501. 
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p·sychologically, by the feeling or quality of enthusiastic ac-
ceptance which is not present in the mora.l attitude. In the 
words of James, religion is characterized by 11 a new zest which 
adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of 
lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.nl 
This results in a "steadfastness of soul with which no other 
can compare. 11 2 The saints "run out to embrace the divine de-
crees" and exemplary service to others results. The extent to 
which a given experience is characterized by enthusiastic ac-
ceptance causes it to pass beyond the moral and become religious. 
There is another psychological characteristic of the re-
ligious consciousness which is still deeper and which is the 
foundation or root of the joyous consent or willing acceptance. 
Whereas the moral attitude is marked by an effort of will, the 
religious attitude results from a higher emotion. The "expul-
sive power of a higher affection" is present so that the re-
ligious person does not, in the final analysis, rely upon his 
own strength of will. There is 11 an assurance of safety and a 
te~er of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of 
loving affections.n3 Divine grace is present to aid the reli-
gious person in those duties where his will may falter and fail. 
"This abandonment of self-responsibility seems to be the funda-
mental act in specifically religious, as distinguished from mor--
al practice. 11 4 
James regards this change from tenseness, self-responsi-
1. James, VRE, 485. 
2. James, VRE, 369. 
3. James, VRE, 486. 
4. James, VRE, 289• 
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bility and worry to equs~imity, receptivity, and peace as one 
of the most wonderful of the shif tings of the inner equilibrium. 
The chief wonder is that it will happen whenever the individual 
simply relaxes and discards his burdens. 
Having shown the rela.tion of religious experience to expe-
rience at large, the place of feeling, thought, and will in re-
ligion must now be analyzed. 
ii. Relation of Feeling to Religion. The basic importance 
and the unusual meaning which James gives~o feeling in his theo-
ry of experience has already been noted. The fundamental role 
which feeling plays in religious experience, which has already 
been implied, will now _be analyzed more in detail. 
11 I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion 
and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary pro-
ducts."l Here James explicitly expresses his belief that re-
ligion not only originates in feeling but that feeling is the 
most important aspect in religious experience. 11 Through feeling 
we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do 
we know about them. Feelings are the germ and starting point 
of cognition, thoughts the developed tree. 11 2 Feeling; in this 
context, means intuitive experience and James is saying that re-
ligion originates in intuitive experience. 
James describes the birth and development of religious 
ideas in his chapter entitled "Philosophy" in the Varieties. 
His generic account is as follows : 
I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of 
religion and that philosophical and theological 
formulas are secondary products. I mean that in a 
1. James, VRE, 431. a. James, PSY, I, 222. 
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world in which no religious feeling bad ever ex-
isted, I doubt whether any philosophic theology 
could ever have been framed. These speculations 
must, it seems to me, be classed as over-beliefs, 
buildings-out performed by the intellect into di-
rections of which feeling originally supplied the 
hint. Feeling is private and du~, and unable to 
give an account of itself. We are thinking beings• 
and we cannot exclude the intellect from partici-
pating in any of our functions. We construe our 
feelings intellectually. Conceptions and construc-
tions are thus a necessary part of our religion. 
Religious experience, in other words, spontaneously 
and inevitably engenders myths, superstitutions, dog-
mas, creeds, and metaphysical ~heologies. But all 
these intellectual operations, whether they be con-
structive or comparative and critical, presuppose 
immediate experience as the i r subject matter. They 
are interpretative and inductive operations after 
the fact, consequent upon religious feeling, not 
coordinate fith it, not independent of what it 
ascertains. 
Religious ideas have their origin in the immediate flux of ex-
perience (or in thought based upon immediate experience). It 
is there that we become directly acquainted with such realities 
of religion as a sense of a higher power, self-surrender, peace, 
forgiveness, new-found energy, truths not known before, etc. 
Intuitive experience abounds with feelings which interpretative 
reason elaborates into religious beliefs. 
These feelings which are present in immediate experience 
are the source of religious ideas. They are the germ which we 
develop intellectually. They are 11 private and dumb11 on the 
level of immediacy. But because we are "thinking beings11 these 
feelings are interpreted and concepts result. In this concep-
tualizing process the intimacy and flowingness of the immediate 
experience is lost but definiteness is gained. As a result of 
this gained definiteness, communication with others is possible~ 
1. James, VRE, 431-433. 
51 
We become social beings as well as feeling and thinking beings. 
Since experience is fluid yet subtly int ercon.."1ect ed, concepts, 
with their abstractness ~nd definiteness, are never quite ade-
quate to immediate ex-perience but are necessary to the l arger 
social life which man requires. 
J ames believed t hat both thought and feeling are deter-
minants of conduct and that the sa.me conduct could be determined 
by either. A survey of the entire field of reli gion revealed 
that whereas the feeling and conduct were usually the same, the 
thought s involved varied greatly. Conduct and feeling are thus 
a1ore ba.sic than thought in religion. 11 The theories which Re-
ligion generates, being t hus va.riable, are secondary ; and if 
you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the feelings 
and the conduct as being the more constant elements.nl Thi s in-
dicates the closeness of feeling and action e,nd the role of 
feeling in religion. Feeling tends to pass directly into con-
duct and to do so without reflective thought intervening . The 
i mmedi ate stream of fe eling contr:dns the impulses which prompt 
religious conduct as well as those which are developed by t he 
rational processes into religious ideas. Feeling is thus a 
source and motivating facatr of r eligious conduct. 
iii. Relation of Thought to Religion. Religious expe r i-
ence has its origin in and is based on feeling. Feeling tends 
to lead directly to action but to act upon our feelings, to giv~ 
them free sway, to let them express themselves as they will, is 
1. James , VRE, 504. 
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often foolish and sometimes dangerous. Perhaps religious feel-
ing impulses would always lead to moral conduct but there is no 
guarantee of this. And it is so easy to confuse religious feel-
ing impulses with other types of impulses. Just as the stream 
of feeling contains those impulses which tend directly to con-
duct, so it also contains those more subtle suggestions which 
develop into religious ideas when thought acts upon them. Thus 
thought has a dual function to perform in regard to religion. 
First of all, thought must clarify feeling and distinguish 
the religious feeling impulses from the non-religious impulses. 
Perhaps this would not be necessary in the deeper mystical ex-
perience. To a mystic such an experience would probably be so 
unmistakable that he would not need to reflect upon the experi-
ence to dteermine whether or not it was religious in nature. But 
most of us are not deeply mJstical and do not have such experi-
ences as James characterizes by ineffability, noetic quality; 
transiency, and passivity. The mystic uses thought not so much 
to clarify feeling as to guide conduct. Most of us, however, 
need thought for both purposes. All of us, to varying extents, 
must (or at any rate should) think for we are "thinking beings." 
Even, James says, when soliloquizing with ourself we 11 construe 
our feelings" intellectually. Both our personal ideals and our 
religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruous-
ly with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits.l 
After thought has clarified feeling it must guide feeling 
1. James, VRE, 432. 
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into the proper modes of expression. Thought must judge con-
duct. James believed that "both thought and feeling are d~r­
minants of conduct, and the same conduct may be determined by 
either feeling or by thought. 11 1 Even when feeling determines 
conduct thought must give its approval. Thought must clarify 
the religious feeling and determine the action which results. 
Religious actions refers to such things as confession, prayer, 
and self-sacrifice. Perfect religious conduct is triune for 
James. For him "perfect conduct is a relation between three 
terms: the actor, the objects for which he acts, and the re-
cipients of the actions. 11 2 Intention, execution, and reception 
must be harmonized. Applied to religious conduct this means 
that the individual who has a religious experience, that is, has 
an immediate awareness of religious feeling, determines, by the 
use of thought, how those feelings should be expressed. The re-
ligious conduct that results can take the form of confession, 
prayer, etc. The recipient of the action can be God, the di-
vine, or other persons. 
According to James, thought has a practical as well as a 
theoretical function. The former was much more important to 
him. When thought clarifies feeling and guides conduct it must 
do so in a practical manner. What are the marks of practical 
thinking and how do we recognize them? They are recognized ~Y 
certain subjective marks. One of these is a strong feeling of 
ease, peace, and rest. Another is the immediate feeling of suf-
1. James, VRE, 504. 2. James, VRE, 355. 
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ficiency. Only to the extent that thought satisfies our par-
ticular practical subjective needs is it sufficient. In the 
field of religion this means such things as satisfying the need 
for intimacy, fulfilling our desire for activity, making life 
worthwhile, convincing us that we are of value to others, show-
ing us that we can win over all circumstances. 
iv. Relation of Will to Religion. In his Psychology James 
points out one of life's greatest tfagedies. 11 The moral tragedy 
of human life comes almost wholly from the fact that the link is 
ruptured which normally should hold between vision of the truth 
and action, and that this pungent sense of effective reality 
will not attach to certain ideas.nl This is where will enters. 
Will is a ~ generis faculty but always functions in relation 
to feeling and reason. The function of will is dual. First of 
all it initiates conduct. Feelings tend to pass directly into 
oohduct (and actually do so if the rational processes do not in-
terfere) but sometimes the feeling impulses are blocked. At 
such times the will must be exercised before action will result. 
Will must then "keep before the mind, and consent to, if neces-· 
sary, an idea of a certain action. 11 2 Volition is thus an ac-
tivity of the self which, when aware of a conflict among its in-
terests, asserts itself in an approved direction. Action is ac-
cordance with reason and feeling (if the latter is approved by 
reason) follows. One ceases merely to talk about religious du-
ties which have been long neglected and performs specific re-
1. James, PSY, 548. 2. Bertocci, Art.(l946), 8. 
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ligious acts. 
There is one specific act of ill which t akes on a special 
religious significance. Religion holds up such ideals as self-
surrender and and sacrifice. When , by an act of free will, the 
individual s acrifices his lower self and surrenders to a higher 
divine power, conduct is rcdsed to a higher plane, a plane which 
before was beyond t he individual's power to achieve. This new-
found energy is possible because an added emotional dimens ion 
replaces the effort of will and t akes possession of it. This 
indicates t he emphasis James pl aces upon the dynamic character-
istic of will in religion. 
The feeling impulses and the voluntary actions which re-
sult from them, pl ay a basic part in religious experience. This 
indicates another function of will in religion , to r aise the 
standard of conduct to the level of sainthood. The religious 
actions with which J ames is concerned are the more personal and 
spontaneous ones. 1 Jame s believed that 11 prayer is religion in 
act ; that is, prayer is real religion . 11 2 It was prayer t hat 
"distinguishes the religious phenomenon from such similar or 
neighboring phenomena as pu1·ely moral or aesthetic sentiment • 11 3 
By prayer J cutles does not mean a ritual or formalized petition 
but ttevery kind of inward communion or conversation with the 
pOi\'er recognized as divine. n4 Other examples of rel igious acts 
are repentance, and self-surrender. The resultant outcome of 
1 . Moore, TRE , 37- 38 . 
2~ J ames , VRE , 505. 
3. J ames , VRE , 505. 
4. J ames , VRE , 505. 
such acts is "an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, 'dy 
namogenic' order which, like any tonic, freshens our vital po-
wers.ul He calls this the "faith-state" and faith is one of 
the forces by which men live. 
James felt that the 11 faith-state 11 is one of the most impor-
tant aspects of life. Only he who has achieved this state of 
being lives to the fullest extent. The importance he places 
upon this subjective aspect of existence harmonizes well with his 
subjective definition of feeling and with his conviction that re-
ligious experience is the basis of religion. It also harmonizes 
with his conception of experience with its three a.spect's of feel-
ing, thought, and will. The flow of consciousness is immediately 
grasped as 11 feeling 11 but has a reflective, teleological factor. 
The will not only attends to this subjective flow but consents 
to it. James is constantly thinking in subjective terms. When 
he speaks of religious experience the subjective aspect is 
especially emphasized. The religious consciousness is charac-
terized by the psychological factors of enthusiastic acceptance 
and by a 11 higher emotion11 which replaces the will. The function 
and nature of feeling, thought, and will in religion are sub-
jective in nature or stem from the subjective life. 
These psychological or subjective factors have been the 
subject of this chapter. The next chapter will deal largely 
with the objective aspects of religion. These two aspects; 
the subjective and the objective, work together in the formu-
lation of religious belief. 
1. James, VRE, 464. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
In the preceding chapter James's theory of the nature of 
religious experience was presented. It was pointed out that 
feeling is the basis of religion and a source of religious con-
duct. Reason's function was to clarify feeling and to guide 
conduct into practical channels. Will entered, when necessary; 
to initiate conduct and, by a final surrender of itself, the 
standard of conduct is raised to the level of sainthood. These 
three--feeling, reasoh, and will--work together in formulating 
religious beliefs. This chapter will outline the ba~s of be-
lief, the object of belief, the two main types of religion, and 
the basic religious beliefs. 
1. Psychological Basis of Belief 
i. Free Will. The starting point of James's theory of 
religious belief is found in his early difficulty with the con-
cept of free will. This difficulty was a result of a conflict 
between his convictions of moral responsibility and the mechan-
ical materialism which seemed to be required by his scientific 
studies.l This conflict was probably highest during the winter 
of 1869-1870 and was further complicated by his general pessi-
1. For an excellent discussion of another conflict in James's 
life, a conflict between his divergent religious interests, 
i. e., between his desire for peace and his desire for ag-
gressive asse:r;otiveness, see the chapter "The Conflict" in 
RPJ by Bixler. This conflict is analogous to a similar one 
in the experience of the human ra.ce and has been trea.ted 
in this aspect by Hoffding in POR. Professor Hocking has 
trea.ted its significance for the individual in the chapter 
entitled '1The Principle of Alternation" in his MGHE. 
mism and depression of spirit at that time. A crisis developed 
in his Iife. He finished reading the first part of Renouvier's 
second "Essais" and accepted his definition of free will-11 the 
sustaining of a thought because 1 choose ~ when I might have 
other thoughts.nl James- assumed this to be true and then pro-
ceeded to formulate his famous statement about free will: "My 
first act of free will shall be to believe in free will."2 He 
spent the remainder of the year cultivating his new feeling of 
mOl."Pvl freedom by acting and by :reading appropriate books. His 
sa.l vat ion was no longer placed in maxims or in contemplative 
views but in accumulated acts of thought. But merely to act on 
the assumption of free will was not enough. Hie next step was 
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to believe in free will. Here we see James exercising the will to 
believe prior to his formulation of the doctrine by that name.3 
ii. Feeling of Sufficiency. In his essay entitled liThe 
Sentiment of Rationality" we find the next step in James's fo:r-
mula.tion of his theory of religious belief .4 In this essay 
James asks: How does a philosopher know he has attained a ra-
tional conception of something? "The only answer can be that 
he will recognize its rationality as he recognizes everything 
else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
~oted from James, LWJ, I, 147. 
James, LWJ, I, 147. 
Cf. Moore, TRE, 50 on this point. For more information a-
bout how James was influenced by the biological sciences, 
his illness, and Renouvier see Mead, Art.(l930). 
The essay will be found in James, WTB or in James, PP. The 
first part of the essay is an extract from an article pringl 
ed in Mind, July, 1879. The remainder is a reprint of an 
address to the Harvard Philosophical Club in 1880 and was 
published in the Princeton Review, July, 1882. 
When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the ration-
ali ty.nl A feeling is the test of rationality. It is the 
feeling of ease, peace, rest; the "feeling of the sufficiency 
of the present moment. 11 2 The basis of rationality is not itself 
rational. At bottom its existence is merely a given fact. The 
interest in theoretical rationa,li ty is only one of many inter-
ests. Another is the practical interest which is also an as-
pect of the feeling of sufficiency. Thought must not merely 
point at the universe in wonder but must do something to that 
universe. Purely theoretical contempilation is of no value un-
less it can awaken active impulses capable of changing things 
about us. Conceptions which fulfill logical demands must still 
satisfy practical ones. That conception which best does so is 
the one which will prevail. When the theoretical requirements 
of two conceptions are equally satisfied, the one which more 
adequately satisfies practical demdnds will be preferred.3 Here 
again James presents his view of thought as an teleological ac-
tivity of consciousness which clarifies feeling and guides con-
duct in a practical manner. 
iii. "Sense of Reality." In Psychology the nature of re-
ligious belief is discussed in the chapter entitled 11 The Per-
ception of Reality." Here belief is identified with a feeling, 
the "sense of reality" which for James is 11 a sort of feeling 
more allied to the emotions than to anything else.n4 Whenever 
anything is accepted as real or whenever a proposition is re-
1. James, WTB, 63. 
2. James, WTB, 63. This volume consists of a series of arti-
cles originally published from 1880 to 1895. 
3. Moore, TRE, 51. 4. James, PSY, II, 283. 
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garded as true it is because this feeling is present in our 
consciousness. Anything which arouses this "sense of reality" 
is regarded as real. Unless this awareness is also present in 
sense-perception it is not convincing. This feeling is psycho-
logically basic to belief and includes the other two psycholog-
ica.l aspects of the foundation of belief. Reality means rela-
tion to our active and emotional life. Any convictions, reli-
gious or otherwise, which possess the "sense of reality" are 
irresistible and steadfastly held because of their feeling aual-
ity and because they meet the demands of our entire nature.l 
2. The Object of Belief 
Free will, the feeling of sufficiency, and the "sense of 
reality" are the psychological basis of religious belief. These 
are the subjective factors in belief. The objective aspect or 
the object of belief must now be analyzed. 
i. Religious Experience Points to God. Even though the 
object of belief, in so far as pu~ely psychological require-
ments are concerned, could be wholly within personal experi-
ence, James feels that religious experience points beyond itself 
to a higher object or objects. 11 The religious phenomenon stu-
died as an inner fact, and apart from ecclesiastical or theolog-
ical implications, has shown itself to consist everywhere and 
at all stages, in the consciousness which individuals have of an 
intercourse between themselves and higher powers with which they 
feel themselves to be related.n2 
In the Varieties of Religious Experience James designates 
1. Moore, TRE, 52. 2. James, VRE, 465. 
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the higher power o:r powers as 11 the divine 11 and warns us to "in-
terpret the term 'divine' very broadly as denoting any object 
that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity o:r not.nl But 
James does not like the term divine because of its vagueness. 
Beings designated by such a name can have too many and too varied 
qualities. What he wants is to determine the essential qualities 
which a higher being must have in order to fulfill man's :reli-
gious expectations. 
But what would the perfect ofject of belief be like? In 
considering this question James arrives at his definition of God~ 
In the essay entitled "Reflex Action and Theism" James gives his 
answer to this probChem. He says that God must 11 be conceived as 
the deepest power in the universe" and "he must be conceived 
under the form of a mental pe:rsonality. 11 2 He continues by dis-
cussing the nature of this personality. 
The personality need not be determined intrinsically 
any further than is involved in the holding of cer-
tain things dear, and in the :recognition of our dis-
position toward those things, the things themselves 
being all good and righteous things.3 
But James certainly does not mean that there is any identi-
fication of ~an's personality with God 1 s. Whatever God's per-
sonality is and :regardless of how similar its characteristics 
may be to those of man, still his personality is something ly-
ing outside of man's personality. God's existence and person-
ality is something which men simply "come upon and find. 11 4 
l. 
2. 
4. 
Another statement and perhaps the most succinct one appears 
James, VRE, 34. 
James, WTB, 122. 3. James, WTB, 122. 
James, WTB, 122. In this paragraph James tends to confuse a 
descriiption of what the perfect object of belief would be 
like with the assertion that sucP an object actually exists. 
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in his Psychology. "lli oerfect object Qi belief would ~ ~ God 
~ 1 Soul 2!~ World', represented both optimistically~~­
ally (if such~ combination could~), ~withal ~definitely 
conceived ~ ~ show 'E!. why .2£!:_ phenomenal experiences should 
ll sent to M £z, ~ in just the very way .!!!. which they ~·"1 
The natural disposition of the mind is to adopt a religious 
view of the world since such a view answers so many questions 
which are aroused by contemplating the universe and satisfies 
so many of the demands of man's nature. 
ii. Complete Knowledge Impossible and Unnecessary. If 
the higher powers do not really exist, or if there is no gen-
uine mutual relationship between these higher powers and man; 
then religious experience is delusory. If they are said to be 
non-existent because they cannot be~efined completely then we 
are talking nonsense. Religious experience, in fact all of ex-
perience, is of such a nature that complete knowledge is impos-
sible. Here is implied James's conception of reality as~ grow~ 
ing whole. Man contributes to reality. But the experiences 
of the entire human race must be considered. Knowledge will 
thus not be complete until "the final integration of things, 
when the last man has had hie say and contributed hie share to 
the still unfinished .;_. 11 2 
Only when this process is completed and the end attained is 
there complete knowledge. Until this takes place there is un-
1. James~ PSY, II, 317. 
2. James, WTB, 107. This view is developed in MT where James 
says that reality 11 ia made; and made by relations that un-
roll themselves in time. 11 (106) See this volume for more 
information about his final view on this point. 
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certainty and doubt. But knowing seldom gets beyond the vir-
tual stage, seldom is complete and final. This applies to our 
concepts of others and of things around us, as well as to God. 
Instead of knowing completely we substitute the practical as-
pect of unchallenged thinking. The reason for this is that we 
live on the wavecrest of experience, knowing only the general 
direction in which we are travelling. Our experience consists 
mostly of process and transition. There is no definite bound-
ary but only a fringe that constantly develops as life proceeds. 
Even though man does not have complete knowledge of God, 
this does not mean skepticism for he does not need. complete know-
ledge in order to act. For James, religion is concerned with the 
nature of the object of religious experience only in so far as 
the validity of that experience depends upon it. By validity 
he means that such experiences form an adequate basis for ac-
tion. In other words, the interest of religion is practical, 
not speculative. Intellectual conceptions are employed only to 
the extent that they are necessary in order to clarify religious 
experience and to guide religious practices.l 
iii. Why Men Believe in God. James approaches the prob-
lem of why men believe in God by an analysis of value. Charac-
teristically he first assumes that the postulation of the divine 
is not necessary for valid ethical claims. Whether or not the 
divine exists there are enduring-moral values. James never 
gives a specific definition of what he means by value. He does, 
however, offer a criterion of vlaue. Values depend upon human 
interests, i. e., something is valued to the extent that it is 
desired by some sentient being. These values are not wholly 
subjective just because they are based on individual desire. 
They are also objective in the sense that they are empirical 
data found in immediate conscious experience. The study of 
values is an existential inquiry. The subject-matter for the 
"moral philosopher" is 11 the ideals he finds existing in the 
world. 11 1 These ideals must meet the test of practicality and 
harmonize with other values. AsP. Olmer says, 
The test of value for James begins with exclusive 
needs and ends with inclusive truths. The criterion 
of value is the affirmation of a genuine experience 
and need, and testing the consequences of that value 
as well as testing the~coherence of that value with 
what is known as true.Q 
But how can these values be appraised? All human stand-
ards, such as utility, pungency and lasting quality, are hard 
to apply and seem unsatisfactory. Belief in God overcomes 
these difficulties. No longer must man appeal to himself as 
the moral authority. Bod becomes the authority as well as the 
source of morality. As Bixler says, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
We must interpret the world in terms of the presence 
and power of these (moral) standards. The power work-
ing to make them effective is God. Knowledge of God 
is well grounded belief expressed in critical judg-
ments which are themselves based on experiences of val-
ue corrected and supplemented by such empirical evi-
dence as is relevant.3 
James, EFM, 185. 
Olmer, JIPV, 69. This is a good source of more information 
on James's conception of value especially in relation to 
personality. 
Bixler, Art.(l942), 582. 
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t ;. 
'· -
By believi ng in the di vine a clear , authoritative , and satis-
factory moral standard is attained. Even on ethical grounds 
men nust believe i n God ~l 
Belief in God al so satisfi es our desire for final i ty . 
J ames felt that t he ultina.te •oral standard which must exist 
in a stable and systematic 1 orEtl uni verse is possi b l e only in 
a universe with a divine being . Such a being has all-inclusive 
demands and by such demands a fi nal moral standard is achieved . 
This being is the object of religious devo t ion.. Without God 
there is ~basis f or an ethical code but i s the demand for eth-
ical stability me t in a human s ystem which leaves out God? 
o l Human systems do not provide the stability which men must 
have so the y search higher . To satisfy this need f or stabil-
i ty requires nothing less than the divine , for all huma.n sta.nd-
a:t·ds are limit ec a.nd inadequa,te . The stand . rds men seek must be 
fi na.l . 11 Standruds of value r:\l'e qualities OJ-' essences which do 
not depend on human subjects fo r their val idity or subsistence 
et cannot be said to remain apart tin awful unmeaningness 1 . rr 2 
In the mere act of sat i sfying the i r desire f or fi nality, 
men fi·1d Et,nother rea.son fo r believi ng in God, i . e ., because 
such a belief makes des i re mo1·e compell i ng . When men believe in 
God their perspecti ve of 1 ife opens out . The scope of their ex-
i stenoe i s incla:cula.bly prolonged,. Wi th religion " the more i m-
perative i ceal s now begin to spe'-'k with an 1:\§.together new ob-
jeotivity and. signi ficance , and to utter the penetrating , shat-
1 . Bi xler , J, 1 21. 2 . Bixler , Art .(l942) , 582 . 
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1 
tering , tragically challenging note of appeal . 11 1 The conflict 
between t he strenuous and the genial moods ends. The strenu-
ous mood triumphs. 11 The ce"paci ty of the strenuous mood lies so 
de~p dOi'm among our natura.l human possibili ties that even if 
there were no mete.physica.l or tradi tions,l grounds fo r believing 
in a God men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living 
hard and getting out of the game of existence it s keenest pos-
sibiliti es of zest. 11 2 
When God. is postula.t ed as a "pretext foT living harc111 our 
a.tti tude towe_rd evil i s entirel y chang~d and , Whftt is even ·.1ore , 
in those who have the religious faith every sort of energy ; en-
durcmce , and courage is relea.sed for overcoming this evil. Be-
ca.use of t his t he more strenuous cha:r~,cter· will always out\'lea.l' 
t he easy- going type. Here i s where the religious view shows 
its superiority~ It postul ates demands which are both practical 
ana authori tat ive. It trimnphs over evil and thus helps to ad-
hieve the good. Because of this t here is no doubt that ulti-
mately it will win. · The final result will be that 11 :religion 
will dr i ve i~religion to the wall.«3 
Last of all men believe in God because in the rel i gious 
realm , i f e . nywhere, value C E•.n be ident ified with validity. We 
" 1" , ' tl t l t d t. , ~ t ' are o.ea. 1ng rlere Wl 1 pos u_a.. es an cre a. 1ve 11 "'.~oo 11eses. In 
it s freedom and purposeful nes s , the act ive will asserts its 
r i ght to believe and in doing so 11 creotes t he ap!)ropri ate con-
dit ions for the opere .. t ion of the object of its belief. n4 By 
1. J ame.s , VTTB, 213-214. 3 . Jru~es , WTB, 213 . 
2 . J ar.a.e s, VTTB, 21::5 . 4 . Bixler , RPJ, 1 21. 
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believing in God the conditions of b elief lead to values t hat 
have real validity . In God is to be found the :final value SCEtle 
which men ne ed. Only in him can value be identified with va-
lidity for he "guarantees an i deal order tha,t shall be perma-
nently perserved.nl 
To sum up what the aut hor has att empted to say in regt=n'd 
to t he reas ons men believe in God, let us quote from t he essay 
entitled 11 The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life . 11 
It would seem, too,--and this is my final conclu-
sion,--that the s t able and systematic moral uni-
verse for which the ethical philosopher asks is 
fully possible only in a world where there is a di-
vine thinker with a ll-enveloping der:1ands . If such 
a thinker existed , his way of suborcHn~ting t he de-
mands to one another would be the finally valid ca s-
uistic scale ; his clai m would be the most inclusive 
realizable whole . If he now exists , then actualized 
in his thought alre~Jdy must be tha t ethical philoso-
phy which \'l e seek a s t he pattern which our · mm must 
evermore approach. In the interest of our own ide c:.l~ 
of systematically unified mor8.l truth , t herefore , 7e, 
are would.-be philosophers must postulate a divine 
t hinker , and pray for the victory of t he religious 
cause.2 
iv. Steps in the Conception of God. Now that we hav e out-
lined the reasons men believefi.n God , we must show the va:cious 
steps which they fo l low in so doing . The t hree steps i n this 
process will now be briefly considered . 
In the fi:rst step God is conceived as a necessary postu-
late for the mo:ral life . With such a conception ma..'1 1 S strenu-
ous mood is :released and his mos t vigorous morality call ed 
1. Ja,mes, CER, 423 . 
2. J~~es , WTB , 213-214. This stat ement does not ent irely har-
monize with James ' s pragmatism. Of . the discussion in the 
conclusion under 11 Pragma.tic Criterion Not Enough . " For a 
wo:rk on the conception of a.n ethical philosophy already ac-
tualized in God see RAP by Royce . 
sa· 
forth. This step is outlined in James 1 e volwne called~ Will 
to Believe . In it J axnes uses the c a.ll to activity a s em argu-
ment for faith in God. 11 In t he interest of our active ne.tu1·e 
a God must be postul ated . ul This i mpChies that God calls f orth 
our l atent energies. 
In the essay entitled 11 Reflex Action and Theism11 J a..mes 
points out t hat any conception short of God i s irra.tional be-
c ause any such concep tion is an inadequate stimulus to our p r ac-
t ica.l ne.t 1.1re . Theism a lways stands ready 
With the most pr· "ctica.lly r a.ti onal solut ion it i s 
possible to conceive. Not an energy of our active 
nature to which it does not aut horitatively app eal, 
not an emotion of which it does not norma,lly and 
naturc.lly release the spr i ngs . As a single strok e , 
it changes t he de ad blank 11 of the world into a 
livin~ ~, with whom the whole man may have deal-
ings . 
The divine is that which sti mula.t es our practica,l natures and 
calls forth our l atent energies. For energy, power , and moral 
activity we must have God. In f ~.ct , our voli tione.l and mora.l 
response to life is one of the deepest organs of co~~lli1ication 
with t he natu:re of the universe and seems clearly to reYeal t h~:~.t 
nature . This is the thought expressed in 11 The Mora.l Philos opher 
and Lo:ral Life . 11 If t here were no God 11 men would postulate one 
simply as a pretext for living hard and getting out of the game 
of existence it s keenest possibilities of zest. 113 
1 . Bi xle:r, RPJ, 1 23 . Hi s chapt er on 11 The Deity" is an excel-
lent discussion of t hese steps in t he concept ion of God 
&~d should be consulted by thos e interested. 
2 . James , WTB , 62. 3 . James , WTE , 213 . 
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This s ame t her.1e is presented in 11 Is Life · rorth Living? 11 
In it J ames says , 11 Be not afrai d of l ife. Bel ieve t hat l ife 
.!.@. v<orth living , and your belief will hel p create t he fe.ct . 11 1 
This is the very natur e of 1•eligious belief . V!e .y not know 
t he very nature of the invi s i bl e world but we must believe th t 
t he significance of our p resent life consists in some relation 
which we have wi th it . The terms i n which we define t his life 
ust be more.l terms which will make l ife trul y significant. 
Life is a. fi ght and God must be undel'st ood as being a:wa.re of 
a.nd as t ak ing :pc:.rt in i t . 
In t he Varieties will be found t he second step in the con-
cept ion of God. 11 Here the i nterest shifts from man ' s active 
energi es to Go ' s s e.ving power . u2 Throughout the entire volume 
t he power of God seems to be the predominant concep t i on . It 
is God who comforts the t wi ce-born , encourages the once-born , 
heals the di vided s elf , communi cates w;i.th saints and mystics , 
and ac compl ishes conversi on. I t is God who is t he uthor of 
saving experiences . Since al l t hese are so real, t he ir cause 
must be re al for so much JOrk re quires a Divine Worke r . This 
me ans that God is the ;nore active , man the more passive . Not 
man ' s act i on but his capaci ty to receive help from God is stres-
sed. ~erhaps the most profound need of t he hum~n hear t is the 
need not f or confuat for for assurance and peace . This state 
of exi stence is 11 the loss of all worry , the sense t hat all is 
ultimately \Vell with one , t he peace , the harmony , the wi lling-
1. J ames , TB , 62 . 2 . Bixler > RPJ , 1 28 . 
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_n_e_ss_i£ be, even though the outer conditions should remain the 
same. 11 1 There is the certainty of God's watchful concern and 
the feeling that everything is or will be for one's best wel-
fare. 
At the beginning of the Varieties James announces that his 
criterion of value is not origins but results. His book is 
largely a description of the results of religion for life. One 
chapter deals with the reality and objective quality of the in-
visible presence which is immediately experienced in religion. 
Two others explain how religion brings serenity, poise and im-
munity to certain diseases. The next three chapters describe 
conversion experience which is often accompanied with highly 
dramatic spiritual activity. Following that there is a discus-
sion of 11 Saintliness11 and its fruits for life.2 
In his conclusion James expresses his belief in the signif-
icance of the spiritual activity indicated by all these expe-
riences and for the reality of the being which produces them. 
He then presents his two characteristics of all religion: an 
uneasiness and its solution. The former is the feeling that 
something is wrong with us; the latter is the feeling that "sal-
vation" comes from a higher power. The essence of religious ex-
perience is the feeling that we are "saved" by this higher po-
wer when our lower being is 11 lost. 11 James identifies the source 
of these saving experiences with God. "I will call this higher 
part of the universe by the name of God. We and God have busi-
1. James, VRE, 248. 2. Bixler, RPJ, 129. 
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nes s '7d th ee.ch other; nd in openi ng ou:rse lves to his influence 
our deep est destiny is fulfilled . 11 1 
The t hird step is to be found in the Pluralistic Universe. 
This step combines t he ch ief char acteristics of t he ot _er t wo. 
Here the e u:ohas is is not upon ma.n 1 s (3.ction or upon God ' s a ction 
but r a.t her upon t he fact tha t God's action and nature \7ill ca.ll 
forth our most active response. This is a plu1·c.listic universe 
in vuich t here are real losses and re al a chievement s . This 
stimulates man to rea l effort, it gives life zest and r.1eani ng . 
Since God is a part of t h is plure,listic univer se he is finite 
also but this makes hi more of a leade r and insp irer. J ames 
had no use for .n absolute God. He thought that 
the monistic and a ll-inclusive Absolute, ith it s 
world i n which everything i s from all eternity s aved , 
appea.led neither to his intellect nor to his i :nagi -
nation. There was , he thought, no good re a. son for 
b~li~vin~ i~ it and still less any good 1·eason for 
~ sh~ng 1t . 
J a .. es is very insistent upon this p oint a s is indica ted 
by me.ny passe.,ges in Plura listic Universe in which he continually 
denounces t he absolute . 
11 God, 11 in t _ e relig ious life of ordins,ry man , is 
the name not of the whol e of things, hee.ven for-
bid, but only of the i deal t endency in t :1ing s , be-
li eved in as a superhuman person who ca l ls us to 
co-operate in his purposes , and who furthers ours 
if they are worthy. He ·works in an externa l en-
vironment , has li11it s , and has enemie s . \'! hen John 
}ill s a i d that t he notion of G-od 1 s omnipotence must 
be given up , if God is to be lcept as a relig ious 
object, he v s surely accurately ri gh t ; ye t so prev-
alent i s the l azy monism t hat idly haunts the regi on 
of God ' s name , tha t so simpl e and truthful a sayi ng 
was generally treated as a par ado x : God , it w=s 
1. J ames, VRE , 516-51'7. 2 . Prs.tt, ART.(l911), 226-227 . 
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sai d , could not be finite . I believe th~t the only 
God worthy of the n ame must be finite . l 
If God is workin g out c history as we are , we c r.,n b e much more 
intim te with bit and r espond to his will more eas i ly . Our en-
tire n e..t ure is stimulated by t he mere thought th&t God end man 
a re co-laborel~s a iding each othe1· i n t he realization of common 
purposes . 
v . The .. ,ill to Believe . By the will to believe J ames 
• eans a 11 justifica tion of f a ith , a defense of our right to a-
dop t a b elieving a ttitude i n r elig ious matters , i n spit e of the 
fact t hat our merely logi ca l int ellect ma y not have been co-
erced .112 This view is further expounded in his essay ent itled 
11 
·l"'he ,~,r-111 to Bel-t eve. 11 Tl t h "" · " t h · '11 " 
_ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ vSlS or -lS essay Wl , ~ernaps 
g ive us a better i dea of just wh.:>.t J ames meant by his concept 
of the will to believe : 
Our passional n ature s not onlv l a.v.rfully ~, but 
ust decide .§:11 ont ion between nronositions , when-
~ it is a genuine o-ot ion tha t cannot by it s 
nature be decided .Q11 intellectua.l g,.ounds ; f o1· .iQ. 
say , under such circums t ances , 11 Do not decide , but 
leave t he QUestion onen , 11 is itself ..§: nassi ona.l 
decision , -just like deciding ~ .Q1:. not , --and ¥ 
a ttended with t he ~ risk of losing the truth: . 
By ~ optionn J a;.t1es means 11 the decisi on between t wo hypotheses 11 ; 
by "genuine option 11 he mea.l1S an option of 11 t he fo~ce , liv ing , 
and mOl!1entous k)ind . u4 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
4. 
J ames , PU , 124-125. 
J ames , \YTB, 1-2.. That the entire qu estion a s to wha t J ames 
really mc"'.ns by t he will t o believe is cl ouded by cert a in 
confusions in his thought ha s been d i scussed by D. i.Iille r ; 
Art . (1942 ). He lists four confusions in J ames ' s t hought : 
proba"ol e and valuable , f a ith and hypothesis , belief ..... nd 
will , reason in t he l arger sense a nd formal rea son. 
J ames , WTB, 11 . 
See his discussion of ootions in WTB, 2-4 in which he dis-
tinguishes bet'reen sevei-al different k inds of options : liv-
ing or dead , forced or avoidable , momentous or trivial. 
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Je~es 1 s idea is that we have the right to accept religious 
beliefs in spite of the fact that logice>l reason does not ap-
prove. 
Such a belief is, according to him, a working-hypo-
thesis--one might say a living--hypothesi's. We may 
live and act taking it for granted as true. It 
shall be true for us. But if we ask ourselves in 
a reflective moment, 11 Is this certain?", we have to 
answer, "No, it is a hypothesis that we choose to 
live by." We throw ourselves into it as a faith. 
But an inseparable part of the thought is that "the 
active faith of individuals in such religiou·s hy-
potheses, freely expressing themselves in life, are 
the experimental tests by which they are verified 
and the only means by whi£h their truth or false-
hood can be wrought out." 
D. Miller believes that James's concept, which states that 
man's will can legitimately be the basis of belief, would be 
better expressed as the right to believe, if necessary~ on non-
rational grounds. He says, in regard to James, that, 
1. 
2. 
Having entitled his book~ Will !£Believe he sub-
sequently felt that ~Right ~Believe would have 
been more fitting, since the former title suggested 
too much a delibera.ti ve highly conscious intent to 
imprint a belief on one's mind, whereas what he chief-
ly contemplated was gradual mental process of tend-
ency, inclimation, preference, 11 instinctive 11 attrac-
tion or repulsion, naturally engendering more or less 
belief.2 
James was well aware of the influence of our irrational 
Miller, Art.(l942), 541. Be sure to see J. s. Moore's re-
ply (Phil. ~., 52(1943), 69-70) to Miller's article and 
Miller's comments (Phil. Rev., 52(1943), 70) to Moore's 
reply. Moore feels that James's pragmatism is very dif-
ferent from his doctrine of the will to believe. Miller, 
1 and the author of this essay, feel that pragmatism added 
to the doctrine of the .. will to believ~ but did not alter it. 
Miller, Art.(l942), 542. However, D. Miller, when he made 
this statement, was not restricting himself to the essay 
entitled liThe Will to Believen as was the a.uthor on the pre-
vious page. Of. Brightman, Art.(l942-1943) for other titles 
suggested and for a general description of James. 
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natures on our thoughts, words, and actions, an influence which 
many philosophers have minimized. James would consider those 
who say they act only following purely rational deliberation as 
being subject to delusions about their own na.tures.l ManIs ae-
tire emotional nature is ever active and ever exerts an influ-
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ence upon his beliefs as well as upon his actions. To act in 
cases where strictly rational proof is not available is often a 
necessity beca.use 11 the character of the world's results may in 
part depend upon our acts. Our acts may depend on our religion,--
on our not resisting our faith-tendencies, or on our sustaining 
them in spite of 1 evidence' being incomplete!'2 
But when, you ma,y ask, is one justified in submitting to the 
influence of his irrational nature in making a decision? James's 
answer would be that you not only may but must do so whenever you 
are presented with an option of the living, forced, momentous kind 
that you cannot decide on the basis of formal logic alone, or on 
the basis of the established facts. 11 For to sa.y, under such cir-
cumstances, 11 Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself 
a passional decision. 113 James certainly does not mean that the will 
can create belief where- there is no other basis for it. What he 
demands is that the irrational factors which help to form be-
1. This raised a complicated question which will not be con-
sidered here. It concerns the possibility of holding as an 
ideal, action only following purely rational delibera.tion. 
James would probably say that it is desirable to approach 
such an ideal but yet would believe that such could never be 
attained because of the irrational aspects of our natures. 
2. James, SPP, 55-56. 
3. James, WTB, 11. Moore gives a short but excellent descrip-
tion of James's theory of religious experience in his TRE 
and compares it with the theories of Otto and Bergson. This 
volume would be of great value to those interested. 
lief by considered. His position is that man's entire nature, 
rational and irrational, be considered when discussing the ba-
sis of religious belief, as well as belief in general. The de-
cision as to which of two alternative hypotheses to accept, or 
which of two actions to perform is to be based upon all the 
evidence available, rational and irrational. This is by no 
means an irrational process. Even formal reason is not excluded 
but rather implemented by empirical reasont. Interpretative 
reason ~ be used for often two feeling impulses present them-
selves and one of these must be willed in preference to the other. 
At such times empirical reason is indispensable. 
As an illustration of the process by which a person passes 
from doubt to belief, the author can do no better than to quote 
what J~lmes calls hie 11 fai th-ladder11 , a series of proposi tiona 
which Moore calls 11 The logic of fai th11 .1 James thought of this 
llfaith-ladder 11 as an illustration of the will to believe. 
A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no 
matter how. 
Is it true or not? you ask. 
It might be true, somewhere, you say, for it is not 
self-contradictory. 
It may be true, you continue, even here and now. 
It is f1!. to be true, it would be well 1!. it ~ 
~, 11 ought to be true, you presently feel. 
It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers 
next; and then--as a final result--
It shall be ~ for2true, you decide; it shall~ as if true, for you. 
By considering the steps in this ladder we notice that only one 
of them ("It might be true, somewhere, you say, for it is not 
1. 
2. 
Moore, TRE, 55 •. 
James, PU, 328-329. Another version of the 11 faith-ladder 11 
will be found in the Appendix to SPP, 244. 
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self-contra.dictory . 11 ) is logica l 'out yet this is the ve ry pro-
cess accOl'ding to which most men live. Their ppe 1 is to will, 
to right, to f ith. Hardly a person can escape doing s o. This 
process is the very way 11 in vrhich monists and pluralists a like 
espouse and hold fast to t ... 1eir visions. It is life exceeding 
log ic , it is t he practicnl reason for which the theoretic rea-
son finds arguments after the conclusion is once there . nl 
J ames has been atte..cked by the intellectuctlists because of 
his appe!"' l to faith a.nd to will as factors active in determi-
ning the t houghts and conduct of men. But Jaa1es re lies by say-
ing t hat i ntellectualism itsel f rests on an act of f a ith. They 
,ill to believe in a universe of rational constitution , they 
have f a ith in the rules of logic , they assll@e the ri ght to say 
that thi ngs e"nd persons other t_ an t hemselves exi st . So we ca.n 
see t hat no one , not even the strictest re.tionalistic philoso-
pher , can esoe.pe from t h e sphere of the ill to believe > the 
right to believe , the f a ith to believe. 
In a l a tter wo:rk (Some Problems of Philosonhy ) J a. es akes 
more clear what he means by t he will to believe , orwha t is he:re 
called faith . 
F~ith t hus r emains as one of the i~lienable b irth-
rights of our mi nd . Of cours e it nust re a in a prac-
tical , s.nd not a dogmat ic e.ttitude. It must go wi th 
toleration of other faiths , with the sea rch for the 
most probable, and with t~e full consciousness of re-
sponsibilities an risks . 
rote especially the phra.se 11 t he sea.rch fo:r t he most probable ." 
He:re is an indice.tion of what J ames really me'U§.s by the will to 
1. J ames , PU , 329 . 2 . J ames , SPP , 225 . 
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belie ve . In f act t he vexy phra se suggests his meaning in that 
it comb i es will and belief . beli ef is not a. volunta.ry con-
ception but an involunt ar y one. 11 le believe; the,t is to say , 
when we t hink of the ob jects in question t hey groun and arr nge 
t hemselves in our mind in a certain configuration of t hei r own 
a ccord , without any inte r f erence from our wi11 . 11 1 If we do t he 
arranging ccording to our wish , we have i magin-tion , not be-
li ef . Beli ef also excludes action (but may lee.d to it) v·hich 
i s r ather an a_ssertion. This does not mean that belief excludes 
all will . On the contra ry , there is a close rel ation. W'nen we 
call a b elief to our mind it is fo r a purpose -nd t his calls for 
a.n act of wi 11. 
J . S. roore believes that t he will to believe m~y be sum-
me,xize under four points , n amely: 
1 . The Ri ght to Believe (or to Disbeli eve , for t h is 
is of course a necessary i mplication of the octrine) : 
t he ri ght to decide matter s of vital conseguences to 
, an (such a s moral and r eligious u estions ) in a ccord-
ance v, ith the needs of man ' s practical and emotional 
n .t ure , when t he intellect is unable to decide t hem. 
( Jot e t he extre. ely i mpo r t ant pr6.visp-=7 
2. The Duty to Believe (or Disbelieve) ; If t he op-
tion i s a 1 genuine 1 one , we not only~ but ought to 
deci de it one way or t he other . 
3. The Necessity of Choice between Belief a.nd Disbe-
li ef on ethical and religious g rounds . Thi s i s a et a-
phys ical , not merely a moral , necessity ; for since mo-
xality and xeligion are matters of conduct , way of 
li;ring , su spension of judgment i s met -physice.lly im-
pos s ible: to refuse to decide is itself a p r actical 
decis i on aga inst f aith--i. e ., if one refuses to de-
cide whet he x or not to believe in God he will con-
tinue to act s if God di d not exist . In othex vords , 
t heoretical a.g:nosticism is pr actical athei s , : it is 
what one does , not ; e:rely wh""t one thinks , t hat counts 
in religion . 
1. ~illex , 6rt .( l942) , 548 . 
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4. ~ Superior Value of Belief ~ Disbelief in 
religious matters. Religion offers us a vital good 
which if true we gain~ by believing now, and lose 
by disbelieving; whereas if religion is false, we 
lose nothing by believing; hence, it1is practically wiser to believe than to disbelieve. 
This statement points out James's conception of the will to be-
lieve, and does so in a superior manner. Man not only may but 
~ decide woral and religious questions on the basis of prac-
tica.li ty ~ ~ intellect cannot do ~· Genuine options must 
be resolved on the basis of the availa,ble evidence, emotiona.l 
as well as theoretical. This is especially so in religion where 
action, not belief, is the essential thing. 
\Vhat James is trying to refute is the use of formal reason 
alone, to the exclusion of such things as will and emotion, in 
formulating beliefs. In his discussion of rationalism in the 
Varieties he says: 
Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ulti-
mately to find for themselves articulate grounds. 
Such grounds, for rationalism, must consist of four 
things: (1) definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite facts of sensation\ (3) definite hypoth-
eses based on su~h facts; and (4J definite inferences 
logically drawn. 
This quotation reveals James's enemy. It is the conviction that 
all our beliefs must be grounded on "definitely statable ab-
stract principles." James is definitely not against the em-
pirical reason based on steps two, three, and four. He would, 
however, qualify step four and include under it practical and 
1. Moore, Art.(l943), 69. Moore feels that James's doctrine of 
pragmatism renounces any authority to the intellect and thus 
cancels the underlined clause under the first point. This 
will be discussed further in the next chapter under "Tests 
of Truth. 11 
2. James, VRE, 73. 
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emotional factors. In so far as reason means empirical reason 
James would say that it is always present, especially in emer-
gencies. Such situations would definitely exclude formal logic 
but need not eiclude empirical~ or what James sometimes calls in-
terpretative, reason. Even in cases where reflection is not pos- · 
sible reason, in the larger sense, may still prevail. 
James certainly does not mean to exclude all rea.son from 
his concept of the will to believe but rather wishes to stress 
the importance of the willing aspect of man's nature. He does 
not mean that the will can create belief where there has been 
none. "What I meant by the title was the state of mind of the 
man who finds an impulse in him toward a believing attitude and 
who resolves not to quench it simply because doubts of its truth 
are possible.nl His principle is in reality "an analysis of 
the psychological process of acquiring belief • 11 2 The 11 will 11 he 
meant was the passional nature just as the rea~n he would in-
clude is the larger rational nature, the two composing all of 
experience. IIIn otheT words, critics were suppose to ha.ve over--
looked the difference between consciously sitting down to pro-
duce in one's self a belief and the slow natural drift of be-
lief formative through the processes and appentencies of the 
whole nature. u3 A-t some stage choice may rightfully intervene. 
We should encourage the tendency to believe instead of looking 
for doubt, and then~ upon that belief. 
James realizes that reason does not give certainty and that 
1. Perry, TCJ, II, 244-245. 3. Miller, Art.(l942), 555. 
2. Perry, TCJ, II, 244-245. 
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there is always room for doubt . Yet , suici de rejected , 
, en must make some bet with the uni verse ; they must 
live by ~ out i on . Therefore , consciously or un-
consciousl y , they place their bets with incompl ete 
kno.ledge end in hope . Fa i th i s , theref ore , part 
and pa.rcel of r-~"lY li:fe whi ch rises sufficiently a-
bove blind impulse e.nd mere desire t o make a pihan . 
The lower e.nime.ls h~we no f a ith , for t hey cannot 
reflect on life 1 s possibili ties . For man no p l an 
is certain; the only choises before him are the 
choices gl'e.nted by h i s anal ysis of his cosmi c pre-
dicament . Through voli tion"'.l fa i th the rea.sonabl e 
man affirms , a t t he point of ena ctment , the ideal s 
hi s re<u :on has approved . The religi ous theori s t 
with his doubts now puts his doubts e.side and sets 
his j aw; he can reasonably do no other ! The be-
l i ever ~ in particul e.r , bets his l ife tha t t here is 
a. God wif.h whose puJ!poses his own idea.ls ar e con-
sistent . 
Vfue t Eertocci here cc:.lls fai th is essentia.l l y what Jt?~me s ·neans 
by t he wi ll to bel ieve . Th e wil l t o bel i eve i s t he will to act 
in a.ccordance ~~i t h our b es t empirical rea.e.on . 
3 . Types of Reli gion e~nd t he ir Bas i c Beliefs 
J ames a.nalyzes men, putting them into one of t wo cla.sses 
cwcordi ng to thei1· be~s i c natures . Each type has religious ex-
periences which f al l into cor:responding classes and each type 
is char acter ized by certa in general b elief s . J a.mes c lls these 
t wo classes of men t he once- born end the t wice- born . 2 e shall 
now consider each in tu:rn. 
i . The Once- born. The once-born are t he healthy- minded 
souls who need. t o be born only once in order t o be ha.ppy . They 
regard the world as a one- storied a~ffair 11 whose a ccounts are 
1 . 
2 . 
Bertocci , Art .( l944) , 368-369. Of . Runes , DOP , 337 fo:r an 
excellent sta.tement of J§;1es ' s wi ll to believe . 
J a.mes h3 s borrowed the t~ms *once- born" a.nd 11 t v:ice- born 11 
f rom F. W. Newnmn . Of . James , VRE , 80 . 
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kept in one denomination, whose parts have just the values 
which naturally they appear to have, and of which a simple alge-
braic sum of pluses and minuses will give the total worth.nl 
These souls live on the plus side of the account and this re-
sults in their happiness and religious peace. 
We can best contrast these healthy souls with their sick 
brothers by considering their respective attitudes toward evil 
and by the place they give volitional effort in relation to the 
problem of evil. 
The healthy souls are optimistic in that they regard evil 
as unreal and as something which can be overcome by actively 
striving against it. This can be done in two ways. The ex-
treme optimists simply deny the reality and power of evil; the 
lesser optimists also regard evil as unreal but feel that a 
more active ef fort on their part is required to overcome this 
seeming evil. But both classes of optimists agree that the 
apparent evil is conquered by their action, not by the action 
of some supernatural agent. Their own effort, so they feel, is 
more than adequate to cope with the problem and to solve it 
successfully. 
At times James experienced the optimism of the once-born. 
One such occasion was during a brief vacation in July, 1898 at 
Adirondack Lodge. He wrote to Mrs. James as follows: 
I got into a state of spiritual alertness of the most 
vital description. The influence of Nature, the 
wholesomeness of the people around me • • • all fer-
mented within me till it became a regular Walpurgis 
1. James, VRE, 166. 
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Nacht . The intense significance of some sort , of t he 
whole scene , if one could only tell the significance ; 
the intense inhu.r.1an remotenesr of its inner life , and 
yet t he intense anneal of it . 
ii . The Twice~born . The twice~orn are the sick souls 
v;ho need to be born t wice in order to be happy. They regs.rd the 
wo1·ld as a double-storied affair . 11 Peace cannot be reachec· by 
the s i n:pl e addition of pluses a .. nd elimination of minuse s from 
life.n2 Not only is natural goo d transient and insufficient in 
amount but a falsity lurks in its very being. It is finally 
cancelled by death , if it ha.s not met soi:He other ene. y . Nor 
does it give an ob j ect of lasting worship. On the contrary , it 
keelJS us from the real good. , r enunciat ion a.nd de spair of it 
being the first t wo steps tov.rard. truth . The entire na tural ~ife 
must be lo st before the spiritual life can be gci ned . 
Wherec-.s the heeJ.thy souls rega.1·d evil a.s 1.mrea.l , the s ick 
souls 1·egard it as most rez:;.l . For them it is deeply rooted in 
both man and in the worl d . For this reason man cannot rely 
upon his ovrm effort to overcome it but must seek a supernatural 
delive~"1!mce . Salvation comes not by mind or viill but by re-
lia,nce upon God. But even though this results in a feeling of 
pessimism toward the na tural world and the natura.l state of man 
still it leads to a. supernat uralistic outlook. .fter t he sick 
soul has been bol'n again he en j oys a happiness which is mor e 
profound and lasting than t he ha,ppiness of his heal thy brother 
and thus finally a chieves a mo!'e f undt:.mente.l opt i mism . 3 • 
1 . 
... 
"· 
J runes , LWJ, II , 26 . 
J~~es , VP~ , 166 . Cf . Lectures IV-Vll fo l' his complete dis-
cussion of the t wo types of souls . 
l!oore , TRE, 58 also discusses the t wo types of souls • 
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J ames hc;.d expexienced t he optimism of the once-born but 
felt e";en more strongly whc_.t it ·1ea.nt to belong to t he t V':ice-
born. In wr iting of hi s experience of extreme pessi mi sm in the 
v.rinter of 1869- 1870 he s ays :: 
I have al way s thought the .. t this experience of mel a.n-
chol i a of ine had a religious bearing . • • • I mean 
that t he fe aJ? was so inve.s i ve and powerful t hat , if 
I had not cl ung to scripture-text l i ke The eternal 
Q.Q£_ ~ ny refu&?; e , etc . , ~ ~ ~ all ~ t hat l a-
bor and ~ heavy-ladden , etc ., 1 ~~ Resurrection 
m£, t he b.ill_, etc ., I t llink I should. have grovm. re D.lly 
insane . l 
That J a.riles belongs more in t he cla ss of t he t wice-born is also 
indica ted by his words in Pl ural istic Universe. In describing 
t he na.tu1·e of :religious ex:-pexience he says : 
Religious experience of the l utheran t ype brings ~11 
our naturalistic standards to b ankruptcy. You are 
s trong only by being weak , it shows . You cannot live 
on pri de or self- sufficingness. There is a light in 
which all t he ne,tura.lly founded and curr e'fu:l.ly accel:>t-
ed distinctions , excellences , and safeguards of our 
charctcter appea:r a s utter childishness. Si ncerely 
to give up one ' s conceit or hope of being good in 
one ' s own right i s the onl~r door to t he universe ' s 
deener reache s , • • of another ki nd of ha.ppine ss and 
power , based on giving up our2own will and l etting something hi gher work for us . . 
In vie : of such statements t here can be little doubt t hat J e,mes 
enj oyed t he more profound ha.ppiness of t he t wice- bor n . 
iii . Gene r al Religious Belief s . The t wo main types of 
religion and t he ir basic beliefs have been outlined. But is 
t here no general s t ateQent of religious belief which both the 
once-born and t he t wic e- born will a ccept? This is the quest i on 
1 . 
2 . 
J ames , LWJ , II ~ 147 . 
J ames , PU , 304- 305. Thi s is a,l so Lovejoy' s interpr et ation 
of the r eligious nature of J ame s . Of . his Art . (l9ll) , 132 . 
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now before us . 
In t he conclusion to t he Varieties J ames at tempts to for-
mulate a gene1·a.l statement of bel ief s , a list of b<?.sic propo-
s itions which all religious devotees could agree to . His t hree 
basi c r eligious beli efs are : 
1. That t he visible world is pcrrt of a. ~nore spir-
i tua.l universe from which it d r s.ws its chief sig-
nificance; 
2 . That union or harmoni ous rel at ion wit h t hat 
hi gher universe i s our true end; 
3 . That prayer or inner conmmnion with t he spirit 
t hereof-- be t hat ·spii·i t ' God 1 or 1 l aw 1-is a pro-
cess wherein work i s really done , and spiritu~~ 
ener gy flo ws in ~nd produces effects, psychological 
or :n2.t eri e.l , within t he phenomenal world.l 
The author feels that t hi s statement is quite e.dequB.te to 
fulfill its l)urpose . It does wi se l y e.void the ete r nal probl em 
of evi l ~,nd i ts solution . A general statement of b eli ef on 
such a difficult probl e will probabl y never be formul at ed . 
J~nes ' s basi c religious beliefs are gener~l enough to satisfy 
both t he once-born and t he t wice-born but yet are specific 
enough to differentiat e religious experience fro m other ty-pes 
of experi ences 13.l1d from e:x-perience as a whole . 
1.. J a.11e s , VRE , 485 . 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRAGM.:\ TIC CJ_ ITERI O.L~ OF R.ELIGIOUS TRUTH 
In the preceding chapter James ' s t heory of religious be-
lief was presented. 7 The psychologica l besi~ of belief, the ob-
j ect of belief, and the t wo main types of religion and_ t h:eir 
basic beliefs were analyzed. The chapter ended with a st e.te-
ent of general religious beliefs . But what criteri a mus t these 
beliefs satisfy to be 1·egarded as true? This is the problem 
now before us . In answering this problem t he distinction be-
t ween the definition ~Qd t he tests of t ruth must be keep in 
mind . After t his distinction has been made , J ames definition 
and tests of truth will be presented and appl ied to the fiel d 
of religion. 
1 . Differentiation of Definition a.'Yld Tests of Truth 
The problem of t:rut h and of its crit er i a. hc:.s been conrpl i-
c ated grea.tly bec·ause rDany- persons f ai l to l!lC?.:ke the : ost im-
portar1t distinction between t he definit i on of truth e.nd the cri-
terion of truth. 11 It i s one t hing to ask whco~t is meant by 1 true 1 , 
it i s quite a different thing to ask how common sense cmd scien-
tists go about to ill,i the truth of statements . nl To define 
truth is to give its meaning ; definition refers to t he concept 
of truth. The criterion of truth i s t he test which the concept 
must meet. This is the probl em of verifica tion . 
The.t a distinction must be made between the definition and 
tests of truth 11 is evident from t he f act tha.t a statement which 
1 . Pap , EP~ , 344. 
., 
~ 
is ac cept abl e on t he basis of t he available evi denc e may none-
t heless t urn out to be f z,l se . nl Thi s is a.l so t he rea.son why 
some philosophers hol d that :regar dle ss of one ' s anal ysis of the 
concept of trut h , any s t a t ement is true only if it is e.ccept a.ble 
in t he light of the evidence. If t he concept of trut h were iden-
tica.l vrith the concept of ~coept ability of e, certain p:ro:position , 
the supposit ion tha t a statenent which is in reality f a.l se might 
b e acceptple on t he ava ilabl e evidence , would be self-contra-
dictory. Sentences des i gnate propositions, f acts verify senten-
ces . But to verify a sentence i s different from di sco'Trering it s 
mea.J.'ling . Therefore we must keep well in mi nd t hese two ques-
t ions : 11 W'hat doe s the truth of a belief consi st in? 11 and IIHow 
can we test t he claim of a belief to be true . 11 2 
2 . Def inition of Truth 
J ame s is not at all cons i stent in his defini t ion of truth. 
In 18'78 in hi s art icle entitled "Remarks on Spencer • s Definition 
of Mi nd a s Corre spondence" he says: 11 Jow, every living man 
would i nstant l y define right t hinking as thinki ng in cor11 es-
pondence with r eali ty.n 3 A similar st a te!'nent appears in Pr ag-
mati sm in which James def ines truth as a propert y of our i deas . 
But i n what does t his prope:rty of i deas consist? 11 It means 
t he i r ' agre ement ' as fal si t y means t he ir disagreement with re-
ali ty.n4 These quotat ions clea.Tl y show t~1c>...t in bot h 1878 and 
i n 1907 (publi shing date of Pragmatism) James hel d to the cor-
1. Pap , EAP , 344 . 
2 . Vioozley, TOK , 133. 3. J ar..1es , CER, 58 · 
4 . J ames , PR , 198 . Also in the pre face to :JOT , v . 
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respondence definition of truth .. As such times he concei vec'l. 
of t ruth as r el~ tion which may be present bet ween an idea ~ 
opinion, belief , st atement ~ etc ~ and it s object . But we shall 
soon see that J ames sets as i de this definit ion of truth for 
another , more 11 practic-:1 11 one . 
The corre spondence definition of truth has been and is 
a ccepted by ma.ny persons and by those who represent qui te dif-
ferent trends of thought . As J ames points out, 11 pxagmatists 
and i n tellectual i sts both accept this defi ni tion a s a matter of 
oourse .ul So f ax there i s no di sagr eement between t hem in re-
gard to the na ture of truth. But a d i f f erence of opinion seon 
breaks out bet ween them when this de:fini tion i s analyzed and 
when t he question i s raised a,s to the pre ci se meaning of " ~.gree-
ment" a.nd of 11 real ity, 11 · -hen reality i s def i ned a s that some- -
t h ing wi th which our ~eas agree . 
J t2tmes fe el s that t he pragmat i s t s are 11 moJ~e analytic and 
p['..instaking" then are the L1tell ec t uali s t s (who a1·e "more off-
hc:.nd and i rreflective 11 ) in answering t hese quest ions . The pop-
ula l' view is that 11 ~. true idea must copy its reali ty.u 2 J ames 
points out t hat like most popular notions t his view follows the 
analogy of t he most common and i11os t usual experiences . He 
points out that when we shut our eyes and think of a def i nit e 
clock on t he w&ll, our true ideas of t he sensi ble ob ject do 
copy the obj ec t. We get a true p ic ture or copy of the dial of 
the clock. But we do not, unles we a re clockm~kers , have a true 
idea of the inner mechs.ni sm of the clock . Our i deas are not a, 
1. Js:rnes ~ PRA , 198. 2 . James ~ PRA, 199. 
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copy of the inner worki ngs . Even though our i deas in such a 
case do not clash with re"' li ty it is h rd to see v. hat the i deas 
copy when we sueak of such t hings s the clock ' s time-keeping 
function or t he spring ' s el ".:lst icity . 
Here we encounter a definite problem.. In the words of 
J ames , 11 1/here our i deas cannot copy definit ely their obj ect , 
'vhat does agre ement with t~at obj ect rne ,n? 11 1 He points out 
th ,t some i deali s ts answer t hi s by saying that o'.lr i deas a.re 
true v1henever t hey are t he i deas that God '"11e ns for us to think 
about the particul r ob ject involved . Others hold to the copy-
view completely . For then our i deas re true to the extent t . at 
t ey apl:Jroach to being copies of the etern" l thought - pr..tterns of 
the Absolute . But J a1es re ject s such t heori es because t hey as-
sume that truth i s essentially n inert s t a.tic relation . The in-
t ellectualist s fe el that holding to a true idea is t he end of 
the m tter . You gr sp the truth , you know it , your thinking 
functi on i s over . 11 You a,re where you ought to be ment e.,lly; "OU 
have obeyed your categorical impera.ti ve; and nothing more need 
follow on that cl i rJax of your r t ional des tiny . Epistemolog i -
cally you are in stabl e equilibrium. 112 In such terms does J ames 
descr ibe hi s concept ion of t he i nte llectual i st ic vi ew of truth . 
J ames feels that these different views of truth invit e 
pragm tic discuss ion. ~n1en pr agmatism starts to anal yze the 
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1 . J xlle s , PRA , 199 . 
2 . J ames , PRA, 200. Here J ames i s guilty of over- ge er~ liz a tion. 
It i s by no means evident tha.t all i ntellectualists assume 
that truth i s an inert s t a tic relation. ~ot even Hegel , whom 
J ames so often denounced , woul hold to this view although , in 
one sense , regel fe els t hat t ruth must have exi sted eternally. 
Loo lce a.t fro. the aspe ct of . e.n , however , Hegel sst r esses the 
dynamic nature of truth. 
problem it asks its usual questions: 
Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete 
difference will its being true make in any one's 
actual life? How will the truth be realized? What 
exoeriences will be different from those which would 
obtain if the belief were false? What, in short is 
the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?~ 
In the process of discussing these questions James changes his 
definition of truth. 
The answer to the question of "truth's cash-value in ex-
periential terms" is as follows: Truths are 
at beet, postulates, each of which must depend on 
the general consensus of experience as a whole to 
bear out its validity. The formula which proves 
to have the most massive destiny will be the true 
one. But this is a point which can only be sogved 
ambulando, and not by any A priori definition.~ 
The same view of truth is expressed by James in another 
article written the same year: 
But how does the scientist know whether his hypoth-
esis is sound? He posits it as correct and procedes 
to the deductions, he acts on the consequences of 
that which he has posited. Sooner or later the re-
sults of his activity will inform him if he has pro-
c-eeded on a false assumption. • • The method is the 
same here as in the sciences, for the proving that 
an opinion is well grounded and we know of no other. 
Obs~rve3 only the time required for verification varJ.es. 
Both of these statements clearly show tha.t James is no 
longer thinking in terms of correspondence. Truth has become 
a property of an idea without reference to reality and it has 
1. 
2. 
3. 
James, PRA, 200. 
James, CER, 78. This was written in 1878. 
~oted from Davis, DOP, 38. This is an excellent source 
for a short statement of the deirelopment of Ja,mes• s prag-
matism. The original quoted statement is in french and 
will be found in Ja.mes, CER, 78-79. 
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become the activity which the idea initiates without reference 
to the essential nature of the universe. 
The final formulation of James's conception of truth as a 
property of an idea or as the action the idea initiates is found 
in Pragmatism where James says: "True ideas are those that we 
- -
m assimilate, validate, corrobr~.te, E£, verify. False ideas 
~those that ~cannot. That is the practical difference it 
makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning 
of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.n 1 
In such statements as the three quotations e,bove, James 
overlooks the distinction between the definition and criterion 
of truth. At such times truth becomes a property of idee..s which 
initiate activity instead of the property which idea,s possess 
when they agree with reality. Having made this change in his 
definition of truth, James proceeds to formulate the tests of 
truth. 
3. Tests of Truth 
The thesis which James proceeds to defend is tha.t "the 
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. 
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by 
events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the pro-
cess namely of its verifying itself.n2 In his article written 
in 1878 he puts it in these terms: 11 Mental interests, hypoth-
eses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action--
action which to a great extent t~sforms the world--help to 
1. James, PRA, 201. 2. James, PRA, 201. 
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~the truth v.hi ch t hey de<ha1·e . 111 Thi s proces s of verifi-
cction or va l i d tion consists of several a spect s hich shall 
now be iscussed . 
i . Ver i fic tion . Pra.g a.tically :~ the words 11 verific tionu 
and 11 valide.t ion 11 s i gni fy cert e.i n p ractical consequences of the 
idea. th .t is ver i f i ed or val i d~te· . Essenti lly , verif i c tion 
me .ns 11 the ordinary agreement fOHJ.lula . 11 11 This funct ion of a-
greeable l eading i s what we . ea.n by an i dee"' s verifica t ion . u2 
It i s the practicc.l consequences t hat Jau1es has in mind hen he 
speaks of turth . True i deas will lead us through t he e.cts and 
othel1 ideas which they cause ' into or t oward other r spects of 
experience wi th whi ch the original i de a s are in agreement , the 
transi tions between the vari ou s points being satisf C1 ctory :~ pro-
gressi ve , and h rmonious . 
Jru~es hast ens to expl ain what he means . He s t ar t s by 
stressing again the rel~tionship between t hought an act i o • 
Let me begi n by reminding you of the f act t hat the 
possess ion of true thoughts means everythere the 
possession of i nval u b l e instrw1ents of act i on ; nd 
t hat our duty to ge.in truth, so f ar from be i ng a 
blank command frmu out of the blue :~ or c;;, 1 stunt ' 
self- i mp osed b our intellect , ce.n a~coUr.'"'lt for it-
se l f by excellent p r actical reasons . 
In an ear lier essay entitled 11 Philosophic 1 Concep tions and 
Pr actical Results 11 written in 1 898 , J ames stresses t hi s Tela-
tionshi p even more . 11 The ul t i mate test for us of wh t a truth 
means is i ndeed the conduct it dict ates or insp i r e s . But it 
inspire s tlk t conduct beca.use it first fol'etells so .. e partie-
1 . J a .es , CER, 67 . 3 . James , PRA , 20 . 
2. J a1es , PRA , 201 . 
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ular truth to our experience which shall call for just that con-
duct from us. 111 
James goes on to emphasize again the practical nature of 
thought, i. e., its instrumental function, and stresses the im-
portance of true beliefs. We live in a world that oan be infi-
nitely useful if we know how to use it, or infinitely harmful 
if we do not. Our ideas must tell us which of the worldis re~ 
alities to expect and our primary duty is to pursue such ideas. 
But the attainment of true ideas is not an end in itself, but 
only a preliminary step toward the satisfaction of other vit al 
interests of wants. 
James uses the illustration of being lost in the woods and 
staryed to clarify his meaning. In his wanderings the lost per-
son finds a cow-path. The path is of importance in this partic-
ular oase only if it leads to a human habitation where food can 
be secured. The true idea is useful here because the habita-
tion, which is its object, is useful. 11 The practical value of 
true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical impor-
tance of their objects to us. 112 This does not mean that the 
objects are always important. At other times the habitation at 
the end of the cow-path may be of no use. At such times the 
1. James, CER, 412. This essay was originally an address de-
livered before the Philosophical Union of the University of 
cralifornia. It was printed with slight revision in the 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, 
1904, 673='687, under the title of 11 The Pragmatic Method." 
Parts of this essay were used in VRE and a considerable 
portion of it was printed, with slight revision, in PRA. 
The ultimate test of truth mentioned in this quotation, i. e., 
practical conduct, is constantly stressed in VRE. Of. sec-
tion entitled "Tests of Religious Truth." 
2. Ja,mes, PRA, 203. 
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idea is practically irrelevant even though it may be verified. 
But still it pays to have a large stock of ideas which are la-
tent, that is, not immediately useful, because almost any idea 
may become temporarily important at almost any time. When the 
time comes for some idea to be used it passes from our memory 
to do work in the world. At such a time our belief in the idea 
becomes active. It is then useful because it is true, or true 
because it is useful. 1 Both phrases mean exactly the same thing 
for James. 11 True is the name for whatever idea starts the veri-
fication process, useful is the name for its completed function 
in experience. 11 2 It is from this that pragmatism gets its con-
ception of truth as something related to how one moment of our 
experience leads to another moment which is worth obtaining. 
1Truth is a property of 11 ideas that guide us toward certain ter-
mini.113 In Pragmatism James expresses this belief thus: 
Primarily, and on the cooonon-sense level, the truth 
of a state of mind means this function of §:. leading 
that ~ worth while. When a moment in our experi-
ence, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought 
that is true, that means that sooner or later we dip 
by that thought's guidance into the particulars of 
experience again and make advantageous connexion (sic) 
with them.4 
Suppose that . in following our mental image of the house 
and food, along the cow-path, we finally reach the house and ob-
tain some food. The mental image is completely verified. "Such 
simply and fully verified leadings ~ certainly ~ originals 
~prototypes 2[ ~ truth-process.n5 But such complete veri-
1. 
2. 
3. 
The legitimacy of this conversion will be discussed in the 
conclusion under 11 Confusions in Pragmatism." 
James, PRA, 204. 4. James, PRA, 205. 
James, CER, 473. 5. James, PRA, 206. 
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fica tion i s not 1 rays poss i ble . I n f ~ct most of t he truth s 
b y which we live are not compl et ely verif i ed. ~ or do t hey ne ed 
to be . The clock f ul kill s i t s funct i on of g i vi ng us t _e time 
even t hough we cannot see t he i nner meche.nism which _ akes it a 
clock . The ci r cumstant i al evidence is sufficient for our pur-
poses . Everythi ng we know makes us beli eve it is a clock and 
t he belief enable s us to r egul ate our li~es ~ so it is a true be-
lief. nd so it i s ii t h · ost of our idea s . 
For one truth-process completed t here are a mi llion 
in our live s that function in thio st e.te of ne.scency . 
They turn us towards di rect verific tion ; lead us in-
to t he sur roundings of t he ob ject they envisage ; and 
t hen , if everythi ng runs on h~ rmoniously ~ we are so 
sur e t hat verifica tion i s possible t hat we omif it , 
nd c.re usually ju s tif i ed by all t h<: .t ho.ppens . 
~n othe r ro r ds , our idea.s pass as true as long as nothi ng c :lal-
lenges t hem. If our ide r:. s enabl e us to live heT:noniousl y t hey 
a re regarded as t r ue without t he verifi c tion process being 
car r ied out . Time is thus S::J.ved . Ano t her rea.son fo r waiving 
compl ete verifica.tion i s t hat all t hi ng s i n t he world exi s t in 
ki r::.ds and not singl y. Once we have di rectly ver ifi ed our i de ... s 
e.bout one me .1ber of a cla ss we generaliz e t he verification to 
inclu e all other members of the s a e class . lH nety- nine er-
cent of t he tirJe such gener aliza tion will be true a s long e.s 
the mind correctly disce rns t he ki nds of thi ngs it encounter s 
in its e~)eriences . 
ii. Consis t ency. So f ar we have consider ed only matters 
of f act. '.'Vhen we pa.ss to purely , ent o-1 i deas end t e i r re l tions 
1 . J ames , PP~ , 207. 
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we are in another sphere where true and false ideas also exist; 
but in this area beliefs are absolute or unconditional and are 
what we call definitions or principles. James lists several 
examples: two and one make three, white differs less from gray 
than it does from black, the effect soon follows the cause. In 
this area the objects are mental objects whose relations are per-
ceptually obvious. No sense-verification is needed and once a 
mental object is true it is always true. In this area truth is 
eternal. Once a concrete thing is 11 one 11 or 11 white 11 or "gray" 
or "black" or 11 an effect 11 , then your principle eternally applies 
to it. All you need to do is determine the kind and apply the 
law. Truth will always result if you have named the kind cor-
rectly. Error results only when the real objects have been 
classed wrongly. 
Truth in this area of mental objects, no less then in the 
area of facts, is an affair of leading. This has been described 
by James. 
We relate one abstract idea with another, framing in 
the end great systems of logical and mathematical 
truth, under the respective terms of which the sen-
sible facts of experience eventually arrange them-
selves, so that our eternal truths hold hood of re-
alities also. This marriage of fact and theory is 
endlessly fertile. What we say is here alrea.dy true 
in advance of special verification, if we have sub-
sumed .Q1!L objects rightly.l ----
Starting with one idea we relate it to others so that a total 
system results. No error can enter if we have classified our 
mental objects correctly. If our classification is correct, 
1. James, PRA, 210. The test of consistency is seldom mentioned 
in VRE. James seems to include it but certainly does not 
stress it. Of. section called "Tests of Religious Truth. 11 
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tl~uth results Emd it .p plie)l to Onl' tot 1 idea.l frer: e .ork . Our 
·i n . is \1edged bet veen the sensible or er an t he i ea l order . 
Our ideas must agree with the sensible realities or ho el e ss 
frustr ations and inconsistencies r esult . 
But we 1ust look deeper . Re ality c ~,n. ean " concrete fa.cts", 
it can mean " abstre.ct kinds of t hings and relc:.tiOl:e pe:rcei ved 
intuitively between the 111 , or ce.n mea.n those 11 t hings t ~ .9_t new 
i de as of ou1·s !'Just no less tel~ e account of , t he whole body of 
other tru t hs lre_dy in our possession . 11 1 This raised t he 
que stion as to what does agreement mean in reference to pest 
truths whic ... we e.lrea.cty possess . 
11 To 1 Et g ree 1 in t he idest sense I' i t h 2. 1~ e li ty ~ only 
~ to be guided either straight gQ to it QL i.!li£. its sur ·ound-
eit he r it QL something connected with it better t hc:n if!!!:!. -1.§.-
agreed . 112 Somet i mes this agree nent will be neg .tive , t' t is , 
t here uril l be nothing contradictory present to i n t erfere with 
our i dea.s . One way to 8.g ree ;i th reality is to copy it .. But 
this is not essential and often not p ossible. The i m- ortcmt 
thing is to be gui ded . Any idea tha. t helps us to guide rea.li ty 
or to deal with it , and whi ch doesn ' t ent angle our processes , 
will be true of t hat real·ty. Thus names , as well s enta.l 
pictures , are true or f a l se . Bot. " set up si .~. il ar verifi ca tion 
,., 
p rocesses , and lea to fully equiv~l ent pre.ctica l results . 11 v 
Just as we , ust t hink consistently , so we must t a l k consistently. 
1. J anes , P_A, 212 . 3 . J ames , PRA , 21 • 
2 . · J ames , PRA, 212-213 . 
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Truth gets verbally built up, stored and made available for 
all by a process of discursification which results when we ex-
change ideas and verifications. Even though names are arbitra-
ry, they must be retained unchanged when once they are under-
stood. James points out that if we call Abel 11 Cain11 or Cain 
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11 Abel 11 we get confused not only about the entire book of Genesis 
but about 11 all its eonnexions (.!!!.£.) with the universe of speech 
and fact down to the present time. We throw ourselves out of what-
ever truth that entire system of speech and fact may embod.y.ul 
There is no direct verification for most of our ideas be-
cause the "stream of time" flows continuously. It can be re-
gained only verbally or verified only indirectly by the present 
effects of the past. Yet if our ideas agree with the verbalities 
and effects they are as true as past time itself. Again "agree-
ment" is essentially an affair of leading. 
True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual 
quarters ws well as directly up to useful and sen-
sible termini. They lea.d. to consi stency, stability 
and flowing human intercourse. They lead away from 
excentricity (~) and isolation, from foiled and 
barren thinking. The untrammelled flowing of the 
leading-process, its general freedom from clash and 
contradiction, passes for its indirect verification; 
but all roads lead to Rome, and in the end and e-
ventually, all true processes must lead to the face 
of directly verifying sensible expe~ience somewhere, 
which somebody's ideas have copied. 
In other words, true ideas are consistent and aid in stabilizing 
human intercourse. Though they may be verified only indirectly 
by any one person, they were somewhere and sometime directly 
1. James, PRA, 214. 
2. James, P~, 215. The latter part of this quotation implies 
that sensation is the final criterion of truth. Cf. the 
discussion of pragmatism's shortcomings in the "Conclusion." 
verified by s o neone ' s sensible exper i ence . 
Here age,i Jaues is not entirely consistent . He surely 
does not 1 ean that all true ideas are .irectly verifiable in 
sensible experience but rather that they are verifiable in ex- · 
pe rie£ce as a whol e . rior to their bei· £g so verified ell 
true i deas are consistent with eEJ.ch other . Even i f there wer e 
only one person i the universe he would still have to retai 
consistency among lis i deas .. 11 I n such a. mora l soli tude i t is 
clear that t ere can be no out vvard obligation , a.nd that t' e only 
trouble the god- like thinker is liable to have will be over the 
cons· s t ency of his own sever~d ideals with one a,notber . nl These-
ideals will , of course , also lec .d to ver ification in exper i ence 
as a whole . 
Ja es does not stress the test of consistency in his prag-
mat i sm. But in so f~u as he does so he allows t'1e intellect to 
h~ ve authori ty in the verificatio 1 of idee .. s . J . s . . .roore feels 
that J ames 1 s pragmatism 11 renounc es any au thority to tLe i nte -
lect 11 and thus is basically different fro '!1 the will to believ e . 2 
The a ..... ove section shows tho,t J ames does a,llow some author ity to 
t he intellect but certainly does not stress the intellect . 
i ii . E;x:pedienc_y. T1·ue i deas are not only verified in ex-
perience end consi stent with tl1e entire bo y of truths , but ha.ve 
a.n exuecliency about them . 11 1 The ~, • to put it very briefly, 
is only the exoedi ent in the way of ~ thinking , just -1!!. 1 the 
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r ight • i s only the exuedient in the way of ~ behaviorl 11 " This expe-
1 . J ames , WTB , 191. 
2 . ~oore , Art . (l943) , 69 . 
3 . J an1es , PRA , 222 . 
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diency is not just a temporary thing, i. e., it is not to be 
judged in terms of immediate results only regardless of long-
term consequences. James realizes that what may be expedient 
for immediate experience will not necessarily be expedient for 
all experience. The expedient must be expedient in the long run 
and expedient on the whole. Experience has a way of "boiling 
over" which results in present expediencies becoming obsolete, 
as it were, which forces us to correct our present ideas. 
This test of truth is closely allied to the teleological 
nature of mind. James believes that the mind 11 functions ll-
clusively f..QL the ~ .2! ~ that do not exist at all in the 
world of impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are 
set by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether.ul 
These emotional and practical aspects of man's nature must be 
provided for in determining truth. Only those ideas which ful-
fill man's aims and purposes can be regarded as true. 
Ideally we strive for the goal of complete expediency, that 
is, for absolute truth. Absolute truth is that which no further 
expediency can ever alter. This is the ideal toward which all 
our temporary truths converge and which we someday hope to attain 
for all of them. Such an ideal will never be completely realized. 
It goes hand in hand with the perfectly wise man and with abso-
lutely complete experience. If any one of these ideals are re-
alized the others will be realized also. But while striving 
for this day which will never arrive (never-the-less we must con-
tinue to think that it will) we must live today according -to 
1. James, WTB, 117. The test of expediency is closely related 
to the test of moral helpfulness in VRE. Cf. section en-
titled "Tests of Religious Truth11 on this point. 
the truth which we now possess. If further experience shows 
that what we held to be true is actually false then we must be 
ready to call it false and live according to the newer~ and we 
hope higher~ truths obtained. 
James's pragmatism is thus a forward-looking criterion. 
We live forward but we underst~d backwards. We look forward 
to a potentially better truth which will be established someday. 
And this newer and higher truth is largely made out of previous 
truths. So far as we mean by reality experienceable reality; 
both it and the truths gained about it are in a process of ever-
lasting change. In this process truth is the product of the 
double influence just mentioned. Truths emerge from experience 
.and dip forward into experience again. In this process new 
truths are created and reality is added to. Truth is the func-
tion of the beliefs that start and terminate in experience. 
4. Tests of Religious Truth 
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The pragmatic criterion of truth in general~ which has been 
outlined in the preceding section~ must now be applied to reli-
gion. James felt that pragmatism applied especially to religion. 
In speaking of the historical roots of pragmatism he credits 
Peirce as being the first to formulate the principle of prag-
matism. He then goes on to say: "It (the principle of prag-
matism) lay entirely unnoticed by any one for twenty years~ un-
til I~ in an address before Professors Howison's philosophical 
union at the university of California, brought it forward again 
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and made a special application of it to :religion. 11 1 
Even though James 11 made a special application of it (prag-
matism) to :religion" this does not mean that his views in Prag-
matism are necessarily consistent or harmonious with those pre-
sented in the Va:rieties.2 Even though the two books were written 
at about the same time (Varieties in 1905, Pragmatism in 1907) 
still they may not be wholly harmonious. It is to be expected 
that the two volumes will emphasize different aspects of the the-
ory of truth inasmuch as the Varieties deals with the theory of 
truth in :rela.tion to religion whereas Pragmatism deals with the 
theory of truth in its more general or philosophic phase. But 
is the conception of truth in Pragmatism merely an elaboration of 
that presented in the Varieties or is it basically different? 
This is the question that must be answered. It is a difficult 
question inasmuch as James does not present a.n entirely consis-
tent theory of truth in Pragmatism. The confusions in his theory 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The theory of truth presented in Pragmatism seems to be 
merely an elaboration of that presented in the Varieties. Per-
haps this can best be shown by presenting the tests of :religious 
truth as presented in the Varieties and then briefly comparing 
these tests with those outlined in Pragmatism. 
In the Varieties James speaks of the process of verifying 
religious opinions and the criteria which these opinions must 
1. James, PRA, 47. This section of PRA is a :reprint, with slight 
:revisions, from CER. 
2. James, PRA, 47. 
meet if they are to be regarded as true. 
Their (religious opinions) value can only be ascer-
tained by spiritual judgments directly passed upon 
them, judgments based on our own immediate feeling 
primarily; and secondarily on what we can ascertain 
of their experiential relations to our moral needs 
and to the rest of what we hold as true. Immediate 
luminousness, in short, philosophical reasonableness, 
and moral helpfulness are the only available cri-
teria. 
In other portions of the Varieties he speaks of 11 our testing of 
religion by practical common sense and the empirical method.u2 
We will now analyze more carefully these two tests of religious 
truth. 
i. Philosophica.l Reasonableness. Immediate luminousness 
or philosophical reasonableness is nothing but practical com-
mon sense for James.3 By common sense he means the 11 use of cer-
tain intellectual forms or categories of thought. 114 Common 
sense is one great stage in the development of the mind. Other 
stages have built upon it but have never succeeded in replacing 
it. These additional stages are what James calls the critical 
stages, those of science and philosophy. Yet the common sense 
stage is fundamental. His thesis is that 11 .Q1!!. fundamental wa.ys 
of thinking about things ~ discoveries of exceedingl.X remote 
ancestors, which~~~!£ preserv:e themselves tbrough-
2]!_ lli_ experience 2!. all subseguent time.n5 It is this common 
sense stage which first acts upon religious opinions in order to 
2. James, VRE, 377. 
377 for confirmation of this. 
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1. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
James 'f((TRE, 
Cf. V=E-e, 18 
James, PRA, 
James, PRA, 
18. 
and 
171. 
170. 
Cf. Conclusion for criticism of this point. 
test their validity. In doing so it uses certain 11 ftmdamental 
ways of thinling about things" or, in other words, certain cat-
egories of thought. James believes that these are forms in-
vented by man and are not innate in the human mind nor inherent 
in the structure of the universe. 
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James believes that religious experience, as such, in un-
ordered until the mind forms it according to certain categories 
of thought. The immediate feeling, which is the basis of reli-
gion, is interpreted and labeled according to what the expe-
riencer holds to be the proper religious categories. Since 
persons differ greatly, so will the categories. For some the 
categories will be conversion, salvation, grace; for others they 
will be love, aspiration, peace. The mystic will use such cate-
gories as ineffability, illumination, at-one-ness. The most gen-
eral category is the feeling of being in relationship with a 
higher power. Each person selects those categories which seem 
most reasonable to him. 
Nor does James feel that any one set of categories is nec-
essarily superior to other sets. What is important is the ade-
quacy of the categories we have adopted. If they help us to in-
tegrate our experiences satisfactorily then they are sufficient. 
James points out that if we were lobsters or bees our different 
total organization would have resulted in entirely different 
modes of grasping our experience. "It might be too (we can not 
dogmatically deny this) that such categories, unimaginable by 
us to-day, would have proved on the whole as serviceable for 
handling our experiences mentally as those which we actually 
use. 11 1 
ii. Moral Helpfulness. After religious beliefs have been 
approved by common sense they must meet the test of the empiri-
cal method which for James means that they must be morally help-
ful. In his search for a test for religious truth he considers 
the origin of truth. James points out that origin has always 
been a favorite test of dogmatic religion but he could not ac-
cept origin as one of his tests. "It is clear that the origin 
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of the truth would be an admirable criterion of this sort, if only 
the various origins could be discriminated from one · another. 11 2 
James discovers that there are many different beliefs as to 
the origin of religious truth. Among the possibilities are im-
mediate intuition, pontifical authority, supernatural revela-
tion, direct possession of a higher spirit, and automatic ut-
terances. Because of so many possible origins, James feels tha.t 
the argument from origins is obviously insufficient. Nor does 
he feel that anyone really uses origin as a test for truth. 
Rather, they use the criterion of results or fruits. In speak-
ing on this point he quotes Dr. Maudsley and then adds: "In 
other words, not its origin, but ~way~ which it works~ 
~whole, is Dr. Maudsley's final test of a belief. This is 
our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest 
insisters on supernatural origin have also been forced to use 
in the end. 11 3 
1. James, PRA, 171. 3. James, VRE, 19-20~ 
2. James, VRE, 18. 
James is very insistent upon testing religion by its fruits 
and not by its origin. 11 By their fruits ye shall know them, not 
by their roots. The roots of a man's virtue are inaccessible to 
us. Our practice is the only sure evidence, even to ourselves, 
that we are genuinely Christians. 11 1 Then again:: 11 At any rate 
you must all be ready now to jud~e the religious l~e by its re-
sults exclusively, and I shall asume that the bugaboo of mor-
bid origin will scandalize your piety no more." 2 
James feels that the worth of a religion is to be judged 
in terms of moral helpfu~ness and philosophical reasonableness. 
The final judge is always that person immediately concerned. 
Each of us formulates certain basic categories of thought which 
we use to determine the worth of religious belief, our beliefs 
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as well as those of others. When doing so we must keep in mind 
that religion is tested by its fruits, not by its origins. Since 
this is so, the categories which we use to judge religion ca"n 
be summed up under the one large category of mora.l helpfulness. 
In so far as religious beliefs lead to actions which increase 
the level of morality they are true. 
Another question needs to be answered. Can the worth of re-
ligion be measured without considering whether or not the God 
who is supposed to inspire the religion exists? James was aware 
of this question and the problem involved. Be believes that 
If he (God) really exists, then all the conduct in-
stituted by men to meet his wants must necessarily 
be a reasonable fruit of his religion,--it would be 
unreasonable only in case he did not exist. If, for 
1. James, VRE, 20. 2. James, VRE, 2le 
instance , you were to condemn a reli gion of hur;.1an,6r 
animal SCI.crifice by virtue of you1· subjective senti-
ments , a nd if all t he while a deity were really there 
demandi ng u ch sacrifices , you iliould be n ~.: .k ing a the-
oretical ist a.~-::e by t acitly a.ssuraing t hat t he deity 
u s t be non- existent; you would be set t i ng up t he-
ology of your o vn a s uch as if you vmre schol · .stic 
philo sop her .1 
J araes confesses t hat we must be t heologi ans to t he extent 
of d i sbeli eving in cert a in types of deities . But t he disbeli efs 
a r e t hemselves t he fruits of man ' s eu1pi rical evolution. .~s 
man ' s insight i nto na.tur e and society develops , there is ost 
striking ch nge in his ~orBl and religious concepts . A deity 
which . ~s satisfactory a few ge_ era tions ago i s abhore today . 
For ex~nple , a deit y requiring bloo» s acrifices to appeas e hii. 
v:oul d not be t ken seriously tod8.y . Once his s anguin ry ap-
petites were ccepted by man . Such fruits were then a ccented 
.. 
e,s being signs of relig ion , but entirely different fruits t:tre 
t he te s ts of r·eligious trut l1 todc . .Y • 
In judging t he fruits of r elig ion we a re forced to employ 
a t h eologic8.1 st2nd rd. of our 0 1!:."n . Yet Jt'1. 1es feels t hat his 
sta.nd r i s begotten from t he voice of hu@an ex_ erience which 
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condemns all g ods and p1· a.otices which b lock the :pa th , long which 
it is ad-vcmci _g . This appl ies to p ositive beliefs as v.rell a s 
to c.isbeliefs . 11 The god s we stend by are the gods we need and 
c an use , tLle gods w 1ose de ands on us a J:-e reinforcements of 
our dema.n s on ourselves EJ.lld on one a.nother. 11 2 "1fhs..t James pro-
p oses is 11 to test sain tliness by comr,1on sense , to use huma.n 
standa.rds t o hel p us decide how f a r t he religious life corm:1e nd.s 
1. Ja~· ec iTRii' ~27-:<.28 . .. ~ , '""' ' ...... - 2 . J mes , _,E ., 331. 
itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends it-
self, then any theological belief that may inspire it, in so 
far forth will stand accredited.ul 
In such human terms does James formulate his tests of reli-
gious truth. Regardless of one's theological beliefs, if they 
help one to live a better moral life they are to be held as true 
regardless of how false they may seem to be to others. In other 
words, practical moral action is the test of religious truth. 
This harmonizes very well with the practical results emphasized 
in Pragmatism. Generally speaking, therefore, the criterion of 
truth in the Varieties and in Pragmatism is the same. And in 
both volumes there is the general tendency to overlook the dis-
tinction between the definition and tests of truth. This is es-
pecially so in the Varieties. However, the two volumes do em-
phasize different aspects if examined more in detail. 
The tests of truth as presented in Pragmatism are verifica-
tion, consistency, and expediency. By verification and expedi-
ency James means that thoughts are 11 invaluable instruments of 
action" and are expedient practically and on the whole.2 This 
is essentially what James has in mind in the Varieties when he 
speaks of the test of truth being 11~ way !B. which ,Lt (thought) 
works sm, ~ whole. 11 3 Consistency, however, which is stressed 
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in Pragmatism, is seldom mentioned in the Varieties. One of the 
few times James mentions it is when he says: 11 It is the character 
of inner happiness in the thoughts which stamp them as good, or 
else their consistency with our other opinions and their service-
1. James, VRE, 331. 
Z} James, VRE, 19-20. 
2 '/;. James, PRA, 202, 222. 
ability for our needs, which make them pass for true in our es-
teem.11l At other times he seems to overlook the test of consis-
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tency. He probably meant to include it but his emphasis upon prac-
tical moral action resulted in its being pushed into the background. 
5. Science of Religion 
James believes that philosophical reasonableness and moral 
helpfulness are the tests of religion. But these tests result 
in a rather vague religion. Each individual seems to be his own 
judge of what is or is not philosophically reasonable. Likewise; 
each individual seems to decide for himself what is or is not 
morally helpful. The result is a hopeless subjectivism and rel-
ativism. Is there no definite content in religion which can and 
should apply to all men? 
James realizes the dangers involved in his conception of re~ 
ligious epistemology and attempts t o avoid them by formulating 
a Science of Religion. The method he proposes for such a sci-
ence is as follows: 
1. 11 Impartial classification and comparisons" of 
the "myths, superstitions, dogmas, creeds, and meta-
physical theologies" of the various religions and 
sects, in order to "eliminate the local and the ac-
cidental from these definitions." 
2. "Interpretative and inductive operations, ope-
rations after the f act, consequent upon religious 
feeling." 
3. The removal of "historic incrustations" from 
dogma and worship. 
4. "Confronting the spont~eous religious construc-
tions with the results of natural science" in order 
to neliminate doctrines that are now known to be 
scientifically absurd or incongruous." 
5. nsifting out in this way unworthy formulations, 
she (philosophy) can leave a residuum of concep-
tions- that at least are possible. With these she 
1. James, VRE, 15. 
can deal as hypotheses,\testing them in all the man-
ners, whether negative br positive, by which hypo-
theses are ever tested. She can reduce their number 
as some are found more open to objection. She can 
perhaps become the champion of one which she picks 
out as being the most closely verified or verifiable. 
She can refine upon the definition of this hypothe-
sis, distinguishing between what is innocent over-
belief and symbolism in the expression of it, and 
what is to be literally taken. As a result, she can 
offer mediation between different befievers, and help 
to bring about consensus of opinion. 
It is doubtful that this method will establish the Science 
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of Religion which James was looking for. There were doubts in 
James's mind also for he feels that "the conclusions of the sci-
ence of religions are as likely to be adverse as they are to be· 
favorable to the claim that the essence of religion is true.n2 
Several points in thlis method arouse doubt as to its sufficiency. 
James does not offer, for example, any criterion to distinguish 
11 the loca,l and the accidental" from the universal and the neces-
sary. He merely states that 11 of late, impartial classification 
and comparisons have become possible • 11 3 He does not specify how 
this is to be done. Nor does he specify how to differentiate 
11 historical incrustations" from dogma and worship or how to de-
termine which doctrines are "scientifically absurd or incongru-
OUSa II 
James does, however, specify that the criterion of philo-
sophical rea.sonableness is to test religious hypotheses, reduce 
their number, select the one which is most closely verified, and 
offer mediation between different believers. Perhaps his meth-
1. James, VRE, 433. This method, in general, has been outlined 
by Moore. Of. his TRE, 65. 
2. James, VRE, 490. 3. James, VRE, 433. 
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od would be sufficient if the above difficulties were solved. 
James feels that attempting to formulate such a science 
will perhaps result in a simple theological belief that wou~d b~ 
generally accepted. In formulating such a basic belief he again 
makes use of his conception of the sub-conscious self. To him 
this self was the connecting link between the "salvation" affor-
ded by religious experiend.e and a scientific-philosophic expla-
nation. It also provided an explanation of the basic religious 
conviction that the self "is continuous with a MORE of the same 
quality.ttl James then states his conclusion: 
Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining our-
selves to what is co~non and generic, we have in the 
fact that the conscious person is continuous with-a-
wider self~rough which savinzlexperiences come, a 
positive-Qcintent of religious experience whion;-it 
seems to me, is literally and objectively ~ ~ 
ll!:_ ~ it goes.2 
James felt that this experience of being "continuous with a 
wider self" is directly and empirically verified in all persons 
whenever they have a genuine religious experience.3 At such 
times the wider self is felt to be the source of saving expe-
riences: 
Those who have such experiences di·stinetly enough 
and often enough to live in the light of them re-
main quite uhmoved by criticism, from whatever 
quarter it may come, be it academic or scientific, 
or be it merely the voice of logical common sense. 
They have had their vision and they ~--that is 
enough--that we inhabit an in~isible spiritual en-
vironment from which help comes, our soul being 
mysteriously one with a larger soul whose instru-
ments we are.4 
1. James, VRE, 508. 
2. James, VRE, 515. 
3. James, PU, 308. 
4. James, PU, 307-308• 
James believes that we must use our over-beliefs to answer 
the question of the nature of this 11 wider self. 11 He was more 
interested in defending the right of every person to believe in 
those over-beliefs whicht~felt were the true interpretation of 
their personal religious experience than he was in formulating 
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a basic theological belief which all could accept. This basic 
belief was as far as James went in his science of religion. Each 
individual naturally passes beyond it, furnishing his own over-
beliefs. James's over-belief was in a God conceived as a power 
greater than man (not an infinite power, however) who is friend-
ly to man and to his ideals. If others disagreed with this, 
James would not object as long as his tests of religion were ful-
filled. Nor did he feel that those who held different over-
beliefs were necessarily wrong. In conclusion he says: "But in 
our Father's house are many mansions, and each of us must dis-
cover for himself the kind of religion and the amount of saint-
ship which best comports with what he believes to be his powers 
and feels to be his truest mission and vocation. 11 1 
1. James, VRE, 377. 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters James 1 s conception of religious 
experience, his theory of religious belief, and his pragmatic 
tests of religious truth have been present·ed. We must now at-
tempt to evaluate his theories, pointing out their merits, de-
picting their shortcomings. 
1. Contributions of His Theory 
i. Significance of Religious Experience. The most out-
standing contribution of James's theory of religious knowledge 
is the significance which he places upon religious experience. 
He negated dogmatic and ecclesiastical religion and made them 
of secondary importance. Of basic importance was the immediate 
feeling of communion with a higher power which is the essence 
of religious experience. This immediate feeling was also the 
11 germ11/from which dogmatic and ecclesiastical religion developed. 
Such forms of religion were lifeless, mere structures with no 
heart. The 11 heart 11 of real religion was that specific feeling 
of relationship with a higher power which is found only in im-
mediate personal experience. It was this type of religion 
that James emphasized. 
Along with this conception of immediate religious experi-
ence goes the negation of all external authority as a criterion 
of religious truth. Such external aspects of religion were to 
be used as guides only, not as final appeals. The religious ex-
perience itself is private to the individual concerned and he 
is the ultimate religious authority. 
Though the immediate grasp of feeling is the basis of re-
ligion this does not mean that if two individuals have the same 
religious experience, they will necessarily interpret them the 
same. James believed that the interpretation of religious ex-
periences resulted in over-beliefs, conceptions which went be-
yond the original experiences but which were suggested by it. 
One could hold whatever over-beliefs he chose as long as the 
two tests of religious truth--philosophical reasonableness and 
moral helpfulness--were satisfied. Not only the religious ex-
perience itself but the interpretation of it were thus left to 
the person immediately concerned. Other persons could question 
the interpretation, point out inconsistencies, and perhaps help 
to formulate religious beliefs, but, in the ftll:al analysis; each 
person is the judge of his religious experiences and of his in-
terpretation of them. 
ii. Harmonization of Science and Religion. James had a 
life-long interest in both science and religion but rejected 
certain aspects or types of both. He had as little use for dog-
matic or materialistic science as he had for dogmatic or eccle-
siastical religion. His interest was in empiricism, a. radical 
empiricism which could be applied to both science and religion. 
James felt that there was no ultimate clash between these two 
fields and tried to convince others of his belief. 
James•s empirical method did much to bridge the gap be-
tween science and religion. He felt that the nature of ultimate 
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reality is suggested by the values and purposes immediately 
present in human life. The application of this empirical meth-
od tended to make religion leave all set forms and fixed truths 
for forms and truths based on religious experiences; it tended 
to make science cast aside dogmatic practices and out-moded 
truths and clothe itself with forms which allowed for religion. 
In religion one could no longer quote the catechism to "prove" 
that God is a loving Father. Such proof could be found only in 
the immediate experience of God's love. In science one could no 
longer assume that ment~l telepathy is impossible without first 
conducting an objective investigation of reputed cases of telep-
athy. If genuine cases were discovered then mental telepathy 
was true regardless of whether or not such a belief harmonized 
with other scientific theories. And even if no theory could be 
presented to adequately account for such a phenomenon it would 
still have to be accepted as true if the facts so indicated. 
As a result of James's broad use of the empirical method, 
religion became more empirical and science more tolerant. This 
lessened the conflict between them. The long drawn out fight 
between them has been due to a misunderstanding and is now be-
.•.-
ing rapidly drawn to a close. Religion has left it deductive 
· Jt· 
realm and science is more and more assuming that reason, pur-
pose, and personality are parts or expressions of the universe. 
iii. Function of Will and Feeling in Belief. For James 
will played a vital part in the formulation of belief. He felt 
that we had to will before we could realize that will does ope-
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rate in the universe. For examp~e, we can not see righteousness 
operate in human affairs until we will to have it so operate. 
Willing and effort are one part of the process, the sense that 
will and effort are significant is the counterpart. Our primary 
duty is to insist that values are valid and to act to make them 
so. Moral values take on eternal significance when we insist 
that they do so. But such insistence must take the form of ac-
tion. James says that we must act like men, betting our lives, 
if necessary, that God exists and that his purposes and values 
are similar to our own. 
Feeling is also important in the formulation of belief. 
Immediate experience is filled with feeling impulses. Reason 
starts with these feeling impulses and takes them into consid-
eration in its rational processes. In fact, reason must take 
feeling into consideration because of the very nature of both 
man and feeling. The influence of our irrational natures is 
always present and active. At times these irrational factors 
become so strong that they tend to become the sole basis of ac-
tion. At such times empirical reason must decide whether such 
b feelings should pass directly into action or ge denied expres-
sion. But whether expressed or denied feelings are always pres-
ent and are always influencing us. It is to such factors that 
many of our beliefs are due because of the incessant demands 
which they make·. 
iv. Pragmatic Factors. There are several aspects of prag-
matism which are commendable. It is a protest against narrow 
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thinking~ it emphasizes moral elements~ it stresses courageous 
faith~ and it has a creative freshness. We shall briefly con-
sider these in turn.l 
First of all~ pragmatism protests against narrowness in 
thought. The pragmatic theory of truth is based on values im-
mediately found in particular human experiences and forces phi-
losophy to widen its scope to meet the demands of as many of 
these needs as possible. Such a theory is most welcome to those 
living in fear~ amid evil, and who are struggling toward higher 
achievements. In this struggle the pragmatic conception of God 
as a personal friend who is helping them and who is struggling 
himself, is a comforting one. Such a belief encourages one to 
make greater strides in an effort to achieve his goal. 
Reason tends so to abstract from reality that its essen-
a 
tial nature is no longer evident. We must bewar~ of such ab-
stractionism aild beware also of interpreting life in strict 
logical terms. Pragmatism warns us of both of these dangers. 
A full life outstrips logik and is to be preferred to an in-
tellectual satisfaction gained by narrowing life to Procrustean 
limits. If we are to achieve a genuine spiritual interpretation 
of man and the universe we must take cognizance of the spiritual 
experiences of the entire human race. 
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Pragmatism, and many other schools of thought~ also stresses 
moral aspects. As Bixler says, 11 pragmatillll not only requires 
that a religious view of the world shall show a sensitiveness 
1. Cf. BiXler, RPJ, 208-210 who lists these four positive as-
pects of pragmatism. 
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to the demands of the whole being, it also emphasizes the moral 
element as religiously essentia.l. 11 1 This reveals James's atti-
tude tows.rd evil. Evil is real, e .. part of the universe and not 
just some aspect which is ultimately synthesized in the processes 
of the universe. We must recognize evil's realness which means, 
religiously, that we will actively strengthen the moral elements. 
Morality is likewise to be considered in determining truth. An 
important aspect of issues, like the one between theism and ma-
terialism, is their moral implications. 11 Not only religion, but 
truth itself must take account of the claims of the moral con-
sciousness. 112 
Allied to the stress on the more..l elements is pragmatism's 
stress on a courageous selective faith. Such a. faith fixes its 
attention on the things in life which it desires and refuses to 
be satisfied by anything less than the desired or to be over-
come by anything that would thwart its efforts. Pragmatism 
stresses this fixation of attention on desired ideas and their 
achievement through effort of will. Moral determination is al-
lied with an optimistic faith that the battle will soon be won 
if we will only will to win it. 
Last of all pragmatism offers a crea.tive freshness which 
only a dynamic conception ca.n bring. 11 Reali ty itself awaits 
the imp~int of our. will. Novelty does enter the world, espe-
ially where we will to have it. 11 3 Many of James's beliefs con-
tribute to this crea.tive freshness. His concepts of free will; 
1. Bixler, RPJ, 209. 3. Bixler, RPJ; 210. 
2. Bixler, RPJ, 209. 
the will to believe, pragmatism, pluralism, all help to emanci-
pate man from the cramping grasp of past dogmas and set forms. 
James emphasized the past only in so far as it contributed to 
the present and to the future. He mined the gold of the past 
but spurned its dross. His concepts meant for him what the 
Church calls the 11 new life. 11 They meant that genuine novelty 
exists, that new experiences are to be won, that an indescrib-
able atmosphere is ours for the breathing. 
2. Criticisms of His Theory 
In spite of the great contributions of James's theory of 
religious knowledge, it suffers from several defects. A few of 
these defects will be pointed out. Most of these defects ar 
criticisms are of minor significance, not decisive enough to 
destroy his theory. These minor criticisms concern James's sub-
jectivism, his overestimation of the importance of feeling, and 
his underestimation of social elements. 
Two really serious criticisms, however, can be made of 
James's theory. In the first place he is not at all consis-
tent in his tests of truth and tends to overlook the distinc-
tion between the definition and tests of truth. At times he 
uses other criteria of truth than those which he has presented 
as being part of his theory. And even if such confusions did 
not exist in his theory, pragmatism would still be inadequate. 
Such a theory of truth is adequate as far as it goes bu~ does 
not go far enough. It is merely part of a larger more adequate 
criterion of truth. These criticisms will be discussed last 
and in greater detail. 
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.. 
i. Subjectivisni. Tluoughout the entire Varieties there 
is a" underlying tone of subjectivism . James ' s two tests of 
relig ious truth failed to overcome it. ~is science of religi on 
likewise failed though it di d go further than his tests of 
t r uth in establishing Et definite con tent in religion a Even 
the fact t hat a person is 11 continuous v-!i th a wider self t hrough 
whi ch s aving experiences come 11 does not escape fro "- l arge 
measure of subjectivism. l Such an exper ience ce.n be inter-
pre t ed in very diverse ways . On the one hand it can be inter-
p!'eted in terms of pantheism and lead. to the concention of the 
.Absolute which J ame s hated . On the other hand it can be inter -
pret ed. in te1·ms of de ism and lead to the strictness of funda-
mentalism. r,Iany intermediate interpretations are also pos-
sible . 
At times J aJ11es spoke ae if t he strong conviction s and be-
liefs born of personal religious experience were thems elve~ in-
dica tions of objective validity . He fai led to mak e clea r the 
distinction be t ween holding beliefs on the basis of f a ith and 
believing some thing which i s ob j eat i vely proved . Such a. di a-
tinction was very hEtrd for h i m because of his emphasis upon 
t h e immediacy of religious experi ence . It is difficu1 t to de-
termine what is im ediate and what is not . Just because one 
feels tha,t a certain experience i s i rmnedi a te does not 1. ea.n that 
it actually i s . We must distinguish between immediacy and in-
terpret e,tion . I mr{ledia.te f ac tors are present in relig ious ex-
1. J ames , VF~ , 515 . 
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perience and t hese factors do suggest new ideas but the i nter-
pretation of tLese il1lli1ediate f actors is somet ing entirely dif-
ferent . The inn edia.cy , ~ M , i s entirel y devoid of e:my posi-
tive belief. It i s just there and forms the bas is for l ater 
beliefs through t he processes of interprete.t ion . Bec ouse .J ames 
failed to make this distinction between immedi acy a.nd interp:re-
te.tion , or because he saw the distinction and could not overcome 
it , he retains a large measure of subj ecti '~'Tism in his t heory of 
l'eligion. 
ii . As 10ore points 
out, one of the difficulties in J ames ' s theory is that 11 he over-
estimated the extent a~.Ld significe.nce of immediate fee ling in 
exper ience . 111 Part of t h is was most likely due to J ames ' s fail-
ure to nake clear precisely what he meant by fe eling. J ames 
def i ned feeling in several ways--mental states in genervl , tran-
s itive parts of consciousness , intuitive experience . The l ast 
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of these defin itions is t_ e one tha,t predomina tes in his Ve.rietie s . 
lnotl'er re~?.son for his overemphasis upon feeling is bece.use he 
f a iled to make clear the re l at ion of feeling to congition . I n 
a later work (E-ssays in Radical Enmiricism) he did so but he 
f ailed to do so in his Va.rieties . 
By feeling J ames usually means intuitive experience . Here 
again He f ailed to distinguish between the immedi a cy of experi-
ence ru d l ater elabox·ations of it . All we can say of im:. edie.t e 
experience oer se is that it is a strea 1 of pure givenness , a 
that ol' .rhich. This i · nediacy is later i nterpl'eted. as fe eling 
1 . l~.:.oore , TRE , 69 . 
\I 
or cogni t ion i n, as J anes woul d say , the interests of pract ical 
demands . .1uch of what J a.mes calls i1 med i a te exper i ence i s prob-
ably interpretation .l He i nterprets i t as being feeli g . The 
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reason for thi s i s t hat J a. e s -tends to d i s trust reason , especie.l -
ly logical reasoning . He felt that t he conceptu~l interpreta-
tion of e"-'"Per ience falsifies it and that to gra.sp reality as it 
actually i s you 11ust do so immedia.tel • As a result J a.mes over-
stressed the import ance of feeling in i nedi ate experience . 
ii i. T nderemphasi~ed Social Element . For J ares rel i gion 
.... s born in immediate experience and remains essentially a pri-
vate and personal concern .. Although J a.llies could neve:r be a c-
cused of be i ng non-eocia.l Oj~ anti- s oc i al , he always emphas ized 
tbe in .i v· dual to the exclus ion of soci a l elements . Th i s i s the 
the1ue of the entire Vari eties in spite of the f act that J a.es 
f elt that it conte"i ned 11 all f acts and no philosophy. n2 But def-
inite philosophic conviction s a:re i ncluded , f ore ost of wh i ch 
i s hi s deep convicti on that pri va.t e , personal religi on i s true 
religi on. 
Even though it i s true t hat religion does ori ginate in L -
timate , first - hand experience , it is mo st regrettable that J ames 
did not point out the social el ements involved in religion or 
at least ment i on t he.t such elements were i nvol ve d . Even if re-
lig ion i s only a psychologicGl, sub j e ctive fe eling wi t.1 no ob-
j ect i ve validity , the exper ience is not i sol a,t eel from the rest 
1- J. H. Leuba makes this criticism of J ar11e s in h i s PRll. He 
sa,•s that J ames 11 has confused pure experience i th ela.bo-ra~ions of it 11 (308) . Of. 307- 3 11 for his d i scussi on . 
2 . J ames , LWJ, II , 1 25 . 
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of life and is bound to effect other areas of life to some ex-
tent. The feelings and experiences of individuals in their 
solitude is a most important part of religion but religion is 
also w(ht these individuals do in society as a result of their 
private religious experiences. It is true that in his later 
writings James does begin to emphasize such social elements as 
co-operation among men for the kingdom and the brotherhood of 
man, but such elements were largely lacking in most of his works, 
certainly in his Varieties.l 
iv. Confusions in Pragmatism. In chapter four it was 
pointed out that prag matism has three tests of truth--verification, 
consistency, and expediency. When applied to religion t he cri-
t eria of philosophical reasonableness and moral helpfulness re-
sult . James seems to sum up all of t hese criteria under the one 
general criterion of usefulness or practicality. 11 The posses-
sion of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of inval-
ua.ble instruments of action. 11 2 Truth is 11 ~ leading that .1!t 
worth while.u3 Truth 11 can account for itself by excellent prac-
tical reasons. 11 4 But James is not at all consistent in the for-
mulation of the criterion of practicality. At times he used 
other criteria or possibly one all- inclusive criterion which in-
cludes a number of lesser criteria.5 
Throughout the works of James can be found many passages 
which indicate the use of criteria other than that of usefulness. 
1. MacLeod makes this criticism of James in his IPPJ, 90-91. 
2. James, PRA, 202. 
3. James, PRA, 205. 4. James, PRA, 202. 
5. Cf. the next section entitled 11 Pragmatic Criterion Not 
Enoughll for a discussion of this all-inclusive criterion . 
When James says that 11 all true processes must lead to the face 
of directly verifying sensible experience somewhere, which 
somebody 1 s ideas have copied11 he implies that sensation is the 
criterion of truth or at least a criterion of truth.l The word 
11 sensible 11 makes it a very limited criterion. When he speaks 
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of the "testing of religion by practical common sense" he makes 
common sense a criterion.2 Whose 11 common sense" is he talking 
about? James, Napoleon, and Jesus would have very different con-
ceptions as to what does and does not constitute "common sense." 
Wheh James speaks of our ~eas agreeing with reality he implies 
that correspondence is a criterion.3 It is very hard to tell 
which of these criteria James means to include and which to ex-
elude. 
Another difficulty with James's pragmatism is that he tends 
to forget the distinction between the definition a.nd the tests 
of truth. This is especially so when he speaks in terms of 
practica.li ty. At such times he makes practicality not only the 
criterion of truth but the definition of truth. Yet in 1898 
and in 1907, as already pointed out, he defined truth as corres-
pondence. Correspondence seems to be his definition of truth 
but at times he seems to have forgotten that this was so. 
James is also guilty of e.mbiguity. Such words as "prac-
tical", "workn, ttexpedient 11 , and "satisfactory" mean different 
things to different persons. James failed to define such words 
clearly. We should point out also that although usefulness 
1. James, PRA, 215. 3. James, PRA, 211. 
2. James, VRE, 377. 
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may be a valuable criterion for testing truth, to say that a be-
lief is useful is certainly not what is meant by saying that it· 
is true. James is thus guilty of a false conversion when he 
says that the phrases 11 it is useful because it is true 11 and 11 it 
is true because it is useful11 mean the same thing. 1 He is also 
involved in a self-contradiction in his conception of consequen-
ces. Ideas which are wholly- contradictory may have practical con-
sequences and would force us to regard both of them as true. 
v. Pragmatic Criterion Not Enough. Ac-c-ording to pragma-
tism faith or belief creates its own verification. There a.re 
several things which can be said about this. In the first place, 
by this theory James is protesting against the concept that the 
success or failure of anything is always established prior to the 
action which is necessary to complete it. James believes that we 
creat~ truth by faith and effort. In the second place, psycho-
logically it is true that belief in success does much to stimu-
late effort. Belief helps to bring about success but doesn't 
necessarily cause it. In the third place, such a theory gives 
courage to those in life's crucial situations. This aspect of 
courageous faith is an important contribution of pragmatism.2 
In spite of these factors the pragmatic criterion, though 
sufficient as far as it goes, is not enough. Pragmatism is 
very useful as ~ criterion of truth but is not ~ criterion 
of truth. In fact the pragmatic criterion of truth is the very 
one which religion has always used for discovering truth. A~ 
1. James, PRA, 204. 2. Bixler, RPJ, 100-101. 
Bixler says:: 
The two methods of discovering truth which James 
suggests are the two which have always been recog-
nized by religion--direct acquaintance with the ~b­ject under discussion, or 'working' interpreted in 
terms of fruits for life. · If an idea is valuable~ 
that for pragmatism constitutes a presumption as 
to its truth. If it leads to direct acquaintance 
with its object it is surely true. Religion sim-
ilarly has judged the genuineness of divine intima-
tions by their fruits for life and by their re-
l~tion fo a peculiarly intimate intuitional expe-
r~ence. 
r 
This shows that the criterion of practicality o/. "working" is 
not at .all original with James but has always been used qy re-
ligion. But if 11 practical 11 and 11 work 11 are specifically de-
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fined and then used completely a very different criterion of 
truth results. Brightman has pointed this out:: II But if they 
( 11 practical11 and 11 work 11 ) are defined exactly and ased thor -
oughly~ they turn into a mandate to examine all the evidence~ 
especially all of the ~onsequences of action~ in the light of the 
mind's total experience. In other words, when taken thorough-
ly, the pragmatist's criterion turns into coherenoe. 112 
But aside from the fact that pragmatism, when examined 
thoroughly, turns into coherence, there are many indications 
that James acually used the coherence theory of turth. These 
indications will be examined shortly but first let us sketch 
the coherence theory of truth. 
For Brightman coherence is a specific method of verifica-
tion. He states it thus: 
According to the criterion of coherence, a propo-
sition is to be treated as true if (1) it is self-
1. Bixler, RPJ~ 212. 2. Brightman, POR, 128. 
consistent, (2) it is consistent with all of the 
known facts of experience, (3) it is consistent 
with all other propositions held as true by the 
mind that is applying this criterion, (4) it es-
tablishes explanatory and interpretative rela-
tions between various parts of expe-rience, (5) 
these relations include all known aspects of ex-
perience and all known problems about experience 
in its details and as a whole.l 
Brightman stresses the fact that coherence is more than 
mere consistency. Mere consistency is the absence of contra-
diction whereas coherence requires the relations mentioned 
under points four and five. "Consistency is necessary to co-
herence, but consistency is not sufficient."2 
There are two very important additional points about co-
herence which should be noted. To quote Brightman again: 
(1) Since coherence requires a reference to the 
whole of experience, some hypothesis about the na-
ture of the whole is essential to the working of 
this criterion. (2) Since experience and science 
are constantly growing, the application of coher-
ence cannot arrive at fixed and static results. 
It is a principle of constant reoTganization, a 
l aw of criticism and growth, rather than a closed 
system. Coherence can never be fully applied un-
til all thinking a~out all possible experience 
has been finished. 
When we examine James's theory of truth in light of Bright-
man's definition of coherence we notice remarkable resemblance~ 
James certainly stresses consistency, as already pointed out. 
This consistency includes not only self consistency but consis-
tency with the facts of experience and with all truths pre-
viously regarded as true.4 James also mentions the empirical 
relations which the coherence theory demands. These relations 
1. Brightman, POR, 128. 
2. Brightman, POR, 128. 
3. Brightman, POR, 128-129. 
4. Of. pages 95-99. 
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include not only those existing between the various parts of 
experience but all known aspects of experience. One place 
where he speaks of such relations is in Pragmatism when he 
says that true ideas are not only consistent but lead to u sta-
bility and flowing human intercourse.nl James, however, does 
not stress these empirical relations as much as he does con-
sistency. 
But what about the two additional pointe which Brightman 
mentions and which are aa important part of coherence? These 
two demands, it will be remembered, are a "hypothesis about the 
nature of the whole" and the realization that coherence is a 
"principle of constant reorganization, a la.w of criticism and 
growth, rather than a closed syetem. 11 2 
James certainly has a hypothesis about the whole of reality 
in his conceptions of pluralism, of reality as a growing whole; 
of God ~as a finite power friendly to man and to his idealst 
etc. And James certainly conceives of experience as growing 
and, consequently, of truth a.s constantly developing and ex-
panding as man's experience becomes more complete. 3 
That James actually used the coherence theory of truth iB 
indicated in the preceding discussion and in many other state-
ments. Witness the statement by James when he says that the 
pragmatist is objectively controlled by the 11 whole body of 
funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercion of the 
world of sense about him. 11 4 "Satisfactoriness has to be 
1. James, PRA, 215. 
2. Brightman, POR, 128-129. 
3. Cf. pages 63-64. 
4. James, PRA, 233. 
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measured by a multitude of standards. 111 11 What is better for 
us to believe is true unless ~ belief incidentally clashes 
with~ other vital benefit. 112 Knowledge will thus not be 
complete until "the final integration of things, when the last 
man has had his say and contributed his share to the still un-
finished !.• n3 
Two passages quite definitely indicate that James used co-
herence. In summarizing one discuss ion he says, 11 In all this, 
it is but one portion of our beliefs reacting on another so as 
to yield the most satisfactory t otal state of mind. 114 And in 
speaking of God James says: 11 If he (God) now exists, then ao-
tualized in his thought already must be that ethical philosophy 
which we seek as the pattern which our own must evermore 
approa.ch. "5 
Whether or not J~~es intended to use coherence as his 
criterion of truth and correspondence as his definition of 
truth, these two are the only adequate aspects of a satisfac-
tory theory of truth. Only the coherence theory of truth in-
cludes all the criteria of truth used by James and all other 
possible criteria as well-authority, intuition, etc. 11 The 
ideal, the goal, toward which all congition moves, is the 
achie.vement of one comprehensive system of logically inter-
dependent propositions. 116 This is done by the integration of 
first-person experience. "Only the completed system of inter-
1. James, MOT, 56. 
2. James, PRA, 77. 
3. James, 'WTB, 107 . 
4. James, MOT, 88. 
5. James, WTB, 214. 
6. Werkmeister, BSK, 156. 
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dependent propositions which integrates the whole of that ex-
perience and which excludes nothing which is in any way pres-
ent in that experience, is at all adequate as an description 
or interpretation of reality.nl This is the ideal of the co-
herence theory of truth. 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 157. 
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ABSTF.ACT 
Inasmuch as the purpose of this thesis is to give an account 
of William James's theory of religious knowledge, the scope is lim-
ited to his epistemology in so far as it deals with his conception 
of religion. Accordingly, the method used is first that of depic-
tion and then of evaluation of this view. 
James's talented family, his wide and varied education, his 
extensive traveling and reading, his teaching career, and his broad 
philosophical background all combined to produce that breadth of 
outlook and genuine sensitiveness of spirit that characterizes his 
personality. He wrote numerous articles and volumes, the most 
outstanding one for the purposes of this thesis being his Varieties. 
James rejected institutional and dogmatic religion for the 
more fundamental personal religion which was its source. Hie ap-
proach to personal religion was more than descriptive. Rather it 
was concerned with subjective phenomena, examined from the expe-
riential point of view. Philosophy was a secondary product whose 
function is to eliminate the local and accidental from religion 
and to ·mediate between different believers. 
James defines religion as the experiences of men whenever 
they feel a relationship to the divine. Such experiences were the 
basis of religion. He defined experience in terms of the stream 
of consciousness with its three essentia.l aspects--feeling, thought 
and will. James defines feeling in several ways: mental states 
in general, transitive parts of consciousness, intuitive experi-
ence. The last definition predominates in the iTarieties. Thought 
is an activity operating on things in a reflective, teleolo~ical 
manner. Will is the effort to attend and to consent in the line 
of greatest resistance. 
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Religious experience can be abstracted from experience as a 
whole. It is not differentiated by a specific religious emotion 
or by a characteristic psychological process. Rather its essence 
is a consciousness of a higher power, continuous with the self, 
which is the source of saving experiences. The psychologica.l re-
sults are enthusiastic acceptance and loving peace. Feeling, 
thought, and will all have a function in religion. Feeling is the 
source of religion, the germ of thought, and the source of reli-
gious conduct. The role of thought is to cla,rify feeling and to 
guide conduct in a practical manner. Will initiates action, when 
necessary, and, by a finctl surrender of itself, raises the stand-
ard of conduct to the level of sainthood. 
Feeling, reason, and will work together in the formulation 
of religious beliefs. The psychological bases of belief are free 
will, and the feeling of sufficiency and the "sense of reality" 
when belief is complete. The object of belief is the divine or 
God, the source of our experiences. We know God only partially 
but our limited knowledge is sufficient for its purpose--to war-
rant action. James feels that belief in God provides a moral 
standard, fulfills the desire for finality, makes desire more 
compelling, and identifies value with validity. A certain psy-
chological process is involved in the formulation of belief. God 
is first conceived as a necessary postulate for morality, then as 
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a saving power, finally as the elicitor of man's most active re-
sponse. In the formulation of belief the will to believe is in-
dispensable. James defines this as the right to decide a forced 
option on the basis of faith and emotion when the intellect cannot 
do so. He presents his 11 faith-ladder 11 as an illustration of the 
process by which everyone passes from doubt to belief. 
James believes that all men can be classified, religiously, 
under two categories: the once-born and the twice-born. The for-
mer are the optimists who regard evil a.s an apparent phenomenon 
to be overcome by effort. The latter are the sick souls who re-
gard evil as most real, supernatural help .being necessary to 
overcome it. 
But what criterion must beliefs satisfy in order to be re-
garded as true? In investigating this problem we must remember 
the distinction between the definition or meaning of truth and 
the criteria. or tests of truth. James defines truth as corres-
pondence with reality but does not consisten~ly hold to this def-
inition. His test of truth is practicality or worka.bility. True 
ideas are a guide through experience and are verified in experi-
ence. They must be verified sufficiently to warrant action that 
will lead to practical consequences, practicality being deter-
mined in the long run and on the whole. 
James felt the.t pragmatism applies especially to religion. 
When so applied practicality means philosophical reasonableness 
and moral helpfulness. Any beliefs are to be regarded as true 
if they are in accord with practical common sense and if they re-
sult in fruitful action. James tried to put more content in re-
ligion by his Science of Religion. He concludes that the basic 
religious conviction of all persons is the immediate conscious-
ness of a wider self which is the source of saving experiences. 
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James's theory of religion is an important contribution~ 
philosophy. It emphasizes personal religious experience, it tends 
to harmonize science and religion, it points out that will and 
u feeling ftnction in the formulation of belief. Pragmatism has 
merit in that it emphasizes moral elements, stresses courageous 
faith, and .has a creative freshness. But James's theory of reli-
gion suffers from s~bjectivism. His failure to define precisely 
what he means by feeling and its relation to cognition results 
in his overemphasizing the importance of feeling and underempha-
sizing social elements. James's pragmatism is inconsistent, 
falsely equates truth and usefulness, tends to forget the dis-
tinction between the definition and tests of truth, suffers from 
ambiguities. It is an important criterion of truth but when fol-
lowed thoroughly turns into coherence. His use of many other 
criteria of t~~--sensation, corMaon sense, expediency--and many 
of his statements indicates that he really uses the coherence 
theory of truth. 
